University of Miami Law School

University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles

Faculty and Deans

2020

The Court and the Suspect: Human Frailty, the Calculating
Criminal, and the Penitent in the Interrogation Room
Scott E. Sundby

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Law and Psychology Commons, and the Supreme Court of the
United States Commons

THE COURT AND THE SUSPECT:
HUMAN FRAILTY, THE CALCULATING
CRIMINAL, AND THE PENITENT
IN THE INTERROGATION ROOM
SCOTT E. SUNDBY*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 124
I. THE ELUSIVE MEANING OF VOLUNTARINESS ..................................... 126
II. THE RUGGED INDIVIDUAL AND POLICE INTERROGATION.................. 131
A. Introducing the Rugged Individual................................................. 131
B. How the Rugged Individual Archetype Turns Voluntariness into a
Special Circumstances Inquiry............................................................ 136
III. THE “EASILY SEDUCED” MIND AND THE SUSCEPTIBLE INDIVIDUAL139
A. The Rugged Individual Finds an Alterego ..................................... 139
B. Miranda v. Arizona: The Susceptible Individual Archetype
Triumphant .......................................................................................... 147
IV. THE RUGGED INDIVIDUAL’S RESURRECTION: RATIONALIZING
CONFESSIONS THROUGH THE CALCULATING AND PENITENT SUSPECTS 150
A. Giving One’s Self Up to the Law: The Calculating Rugged Individual
and the Battle of Wits .......................................................................... 151
B. Giving One’s Self Up to the Law: The Interrogation Room As
Confessional ........................................................................................ 157
V. JUDGING THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE RUGGED AND SUSCEPTIBLE
INDIVIDUAL ............................................................................................. 160
A. Critiquing the “Battle of Wits” ...................................................... 161
B. Critiquing the Interrogation Room as Confessional ...................... 165
C. False Confessions ........................................................................... 168
D. Beyond False Confessions: Miranda and the Citizen-Government
Relationship ......................................................................................... 178
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 185

*
Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, University of Miami School of Law.
The author would like to thank Susan Bandes, Darryl Brown, Donald Dripps, Brandon Garrett, Susan
Klein, and Chris Slobogin for their comments and advice. I would like to especially thank David Bruck
for alerting me to the aftermath of the Harris v. South Carolina case and providing archival materials,
see infra notes 279–80 and accompanying text.

123

124

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 98:123

INTRODUCTION
With each new Supreme Court opinion, Miranda v. Arizona 1
increasingly resembles an aging film star, making a major splash when first
coming onto the scene, persevering through mid-career ups and downs, and
then gradually losing vitality until finally receiving a Lifetime Achievement
Award that tacitly suggests the best years belong to the past.2 But even if
Miranda’s star power now appears to be fading, few doctrines have
commanded such a vast number of legal paparazzi chronicling the case’s
every step or engendered such fervent arguments over whether Miranda’s
oeuvre should be judged a success or failure.3 Miranda, in short, is one of
those cases that lies at the convergence of so many flashpoint issues—
ranging from views of judicial activism to concerns over police abuse—that
we inevitably are tugged back to the most basic question that can be asked:
What role should the Constitution play in regulating police interrogation?
To someone new to the area, that may seem like an exceedingly odd
question to still be asking since the Supreme Court has had over a halfcentury to elaborate upon Miranda.4 The strangeness only grows, however,
when one realizes that Miranda is simply one episode in a far longer
struggle by the Court. Indeed, it would be quite understandable if someone
were to develop constitutional vertigo trying to trace the Supreme Court’s
approach to police interrogation practices through the various constitutional
byways of the Due Process Cause, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.5 At times the
Court has adopted a strongly regulative approach toward individuals
undergoing police questioning, only to then turn around and espouse a far
more laissez-faire attitude toward what happens in the interrogation room.

1.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2.
See infra notes 141–146 and accompanying text (discussing Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000) and the dilution of Miranda’s protections).
3.
Two recent symposia on Miranda’s fiftieth anniversary capture both the continued
fascination with the opinion and the wide breadth of views held about the opinion and its merits. See
Symposium, The Fiftieth Anniversary of Miranda v. Arizona, 97 B.U. L. REV. 685 (2017); Symposium,
Entering the Second Fifty Years of Miranda, 50 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017).
4.
Professor Kit Kinports aptly described the Supreme Court’s approach as a “love-hate
relationship” with the Miranda decision. See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Love-Hate Relationship
with Miranda, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 375 (2011). Professor Ron Allen, after objecting that
the term “incoherent” is too often used and misused in legal writing, left no doubt that the term did,
however, apply to Miranda: “The Miranda debate, and much that preceded it, is literally incoherent in
that it makes no sense at all.” Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71, 73
(2006).
5.
See Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the Voluntariness
Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10–14 (2015) (tracing the different constitutional rationale that the Court has
used to regulate confessions).
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As would be expected, a fair amount of attention has been devoted both
to decrying and to attempting to explain these doctrinal mood swings. 6
However, while the scholarship is both insightful and thought provoking,
this Article contends that a key inroad into understanding the Court’s
interrogation cases has largely been overlooked.
A tour through the Court’s cases, beginning with the Court’s early Due
Process cases and proceeding through Miranda and beyond, reveals that
much of the Court’s muddled jurisprudence regarding police interrogation
is a result of the Justices’ differing views of why individuals confess.
Whether approached as a Due Process inquiry, a Fifth Amendment privilege
issue, or a Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel challenge, the Court has cast
the critical inquiry as a question of historical fact: did the defendant
“voluntarily” decide to confess or waive his rights?7 It turns out, however,
that answering the voluntariness question requires making assumptions that
transform the decision maker into as much psychoanalyst as fact finder. And
once we begin to pay close attention to the Court’s various depictions of
6.
For an eclectic sampling of critiques and perspectives, see Donald A. Dripps, Miranda for
the Next Fifty Years: Why the Fifth Amendment Should Go Fourth, 97 B.U. L. REV. 893 (2017)
(reviewing many of the differing views of Miranda as a way to make insightful comparisons between
Fourth and Fifth Amendment caselaw developments since Miranda); Susan R. Klein, Transparency and
Truth During Custodial Interrogations and Beyond, 97 B.U. L. REV. 993 (2017); Yale Kamisar, On the
Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It—And What Happened to
It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163 (2007) (detailing the “sad reality” of Miranda); Allen, supra note 4; Darryl
K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 801 (2004); William Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975 (2001); Donald
A. Dripps, Is the Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A Proposed Fifth Amendment Synthesis, 17
CONST. COMMENT 19 (2000); Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by
the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775 (1997); Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995).
7.
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104
(1985) (prioritizing the voluntariness question in evaluating the constitutionality of a confession). This
Article uses voluntariness as the umbrella concept to assess the Court’s approach to confessions. While
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination speaks in terms of compelled statements and
the Court’s Due Process cases use voluntariness, the concepts for all practical purposes have merged.
And, of course, Miranda as the Court’s central Fifth Amendment case revolves around the idea of
whether the warnings were voluntarily waived. As Professor Godsey has accurately observed, even if
Miranda originally was crafting out its own law around compulsion, the Court “has [since] unmoored
the warnings from the Miranda concept of compulsion, and now considers them a first-step litmus test
for determining the voluntariness of a confession.” Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda
Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 811 (2006)
(citation omitted). See also, Allen, supra note 4 at 75–76 (critiquing Miranda for addressing the Due
Process voluntariness test’s problems through what essentially was another voluntariness test simply
preceded by warnings); Laurence A. Brenner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s
Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 147–54 (1989). After Montejo
v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 788 (2009), even the Court’s Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel cases in the
interrogation context, which at one time appeared to articulate a distinct rationale, are now merged with
Miranda’s inquiry whether the rights were voluntarily waived when being questioned by the police. See
Eda Katharine Tinto, Wavering on Waiver: Montejo v. Louisiana and the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1335, 1369 (2011) (“In Montejo, the Supreme Court collapsed the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel into the Fifth Amendment right to counsel . . . .”).
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who is being interrogated, we begin to see how the Court’s image of the
way that an individual should react if subjected to police questioning
strongly shapes the contours of the constitutional right that is fashioned.
This Article undertakes that examination and discovers that the Justices
have espoused two basic characterizations of a suspect being interrogated:
that of the “rugged individual” and that of the “susceptible individual.” As
the examination reveals, each characterization has had a period of
ascendency and the protections that are afforded a suspect largely depend
on which characterization a majority of the Court invokes. This framework,
however, does more than help explain the confusion surrounding the case
law. By bringing these two competing visions out into the open, a direct
examination from both an empirical and doctrinal viewpoint can be made
of their underlying assumptions about human behavior.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part One looks at how the Court has
struggled with the meaning of ‘voluntariness’ in the context of interrogation
and introduces the idea that the Justices’ vision of who is seated in the
interrogation room heavily colors that determination. Part Two looks at how
the Court has at times envisioned the suspect as the “rugged individual,” an
individual who knows his or her rights and can stand up to the pressures of
interrogation absent exceptional circumstances. Part Three explores the rise
of a different characterization, that of the “susceptible individual” in the
interrogation room, and how at its zenith this characterization resulted in the
landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona, an ascendency that has now
largely been replaced by the return of the rugged individual as the primary
archetype. Part Four analyzes the Court’s recent resurrection of the rugged
individual perspective and how it rationalizes confessions as either the
product of a “calculating rugged individual” who mistakenly believed that
he could win a battle of wits with the police, or as the decision of a “penitent
rugged individual” choosing to confess as a first step towards redemption.
In Part Five, the Article looks at the rugged individual and susceptible
individual models in light of empirical and doctrinal critiques, as well as
their implications for false confessions and government-citizen relations.
The empirical evidence and DNA-exoneration cases show that the rugged
individual archetype is out-of-step with the realities of the interrogation
room and puts minority and poorer defendants at a distinct disadvantage in
exercising their rights.
I. THE ELUSIVE MEANING OF VOLUNTARINESS
The Court’s voluntariness doctrine is deceptively easy to state:
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used
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against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity
for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confessions
offends due process.8
However, as those familiar with the Court’s struggle to give meaning to the
doctrine are well aware, the Court’s efforts to expound upon the
voluntariness question offer up a ready piñata at which to take a swing. Even
the Court itself has taken a swing, observing with apparent agreement that
commentators have critiqued the voluntariness doctrine as “‘useless’ . . .
‘[p]erplexing’ . . . and ‘legal double-talk.’”9
The crux of the critique is that the doctrine at bottom is simply too
amorphous to be effective; as one commentator pithily noted, “virtually
everything is relevant and nothing is determinative.” 10 Professor Paul
Marcus has catalogued a number of factors that courts have considered in
trying to assess if an individual’s will was overborne: deception
(specifically, deceptions about the legal process), fabricated physical
evidence, threats, promises, length of interrogation, and a defendant’s age,
health, and intelligence.11 However, no ready algorithm exists for how those
factors should be weighed or viewed, or even counted at all.12 The result, as
Judge Richard Posner candidly observed in one interrogation case, is that:
[T]he proposition that a confession, to be admissible, must be the
product of free choice . . . leads nowhere. Taken seriously it would
require the exclusion of virtually all fruits of custodial interrogation,
since few choices to confess can be thought truly ‘free’ when made
by a person who is incarcerated and is being questioned by armed
officers without the presence of counsel or anyone else to give him
moral support. The formula is not taken seriously.13
The first step to unraveling the puzzle of how the courts are approaching
confessions, therefore, is to acknowledge that the “voluntariness”
determination is not a factual determination but a judicial and societal
construct. This is an observation that the Supreme Court itself has

8.
Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602. See also supra note 7 (discussing the central role that the
voluntariness inquiry plays throughout the Court’s various constitutional doctrines concerning
interrogation).
9.
Miller, 474 U.S. at 116 n.4 (citations omitted).
10.
Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of
Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 745 (1987).
11.
Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in
Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 614–16 (2006).
12.
Courts are divided, for example, over whether police use of fabricated physical evidence
during an interrogation implicates voluntariness concerns. See id.
13.
United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1129 (7th Cir. 1990).
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acknowledged, describing the inquiry as an “amphibian”14 with a “hybrid
quality” that, “because it subsum[es] a ‘complex of values,’ . . . militates
against treating the question as one of simple historical fact.”15 Judge Posner
likewise has observed that:
[W]hether a confession is voluntary is not really a fact, but a
characterization. There is indeed no ‘faculty of will’ inside our heads
that has two states, on and off, such that through careful
reconstruction of events the observer can determine whether the
switch was on when the defendant was confessing.16
Yet, despite these critiques, when confronted with the question of
whether to admit a confession, courts must make their dutiful pilgrimage
back to the Court’s formally stated voluntariness test with its impossible
demand that the judge determine whether the “voluntariness switch” was in
fact on or off.17 And unsurprisingly this amorphousness carries over to the
voluntariness inquiries throughout the area of police interrogation, such as
the question of whether the suspect voluntarily waived his Miranda rights
or voluntarily surrendered his right to an attorney.18
The result is that the voluntariness determination is essentially the legal
system’s version of an Escher drawing, where the figure that one sees
depends upon the angle of the judge’s observation. True, some fact patterns
are—let us pray—likely to be seen by all jurists as involuntary. In the
infamous 1936 case Brown v. Mississippi, 19 for example, the AfricanAmerican defendants were subjected to partial hangings and brutal
14.
Culombe, 367 U.S. at 605 (explaining that the test is “amphibian” because “[i]t purports at
once to describe an internal psychic state and to characterize that state for legal purposes”).
15.
Miller, 474 U.S. at 116 (citations omitted).
16.
Rutledge, 900 F.2d at 1128.
17.
We do know that the courts generally decide that the defendant’s “voluntariness switch” was
on. Peter Nardulli’s studies found that the exclusionary rule led to the suppression of only a miniscule
percentage of confessions. See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An
Empirical Assessment, 8 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585 (1983); Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What
We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the “Costs” of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and
Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 8 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611 (1983) (reviewing studies and concluding
that the exclusionary rule does not have a “major impact” on the prosecution of felony arrests); see also
John P. Gross, Dangerous Criminals, the Search for the Truth and Effective Law Enforcement: How the
Supreme Court Overestimates the Social Costs of the Exclusionary Rule, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 545,
547 (2011) (challenging the Supreme Court’s assumptions that the exclusionary rule imposes significant
social costs).
18.
See supra note 7 (noting how Miranda revolves around voluntariness inquiries).
19.
297 U.S. 278 (1936). And perhaps prayers, such as those raised in the prior sentence, are not
always answered. The Mississippi Supreme Court did not find error in admitting the confessions into
trial, albeit primarily on procedural grounds that objections to the confessions had not been properly
raised. Brown v. State, 161 So. 465 (1935). But see id. at 472 (Griffith, J., dissenting) (“To my mind it
would be as becoming a court to say that a lynching party has become legitimate and legal because the
victim, while being hung by the mob, did not object in the proper form of words at precisely the proper
stage of the proceedings.”).
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whippings until they confessed. Adding to the outrage was how those
engaged in the brutality felt absolutely no compunction over what they had
done; one deputy who witnessed the brutalities proudly testified at trial that
the beatings were “[n]ot too much for a negro; not as much as I would have
done if it were left to me.” 20 The Court described the trial transcript as
“read[ing] . . . like pages torn from some medieval account” and readily
found that the confessions were involuntary.21
However, given the horrific facts, a case like Brown does not really
advance the voluntariness inquiry in a meaningful way. Such shocking
circumstances may even give a false sense of security that the voluntariness
question is one that can readily yield a binary answer. The real work lies
with those cases where the constellation of facts touches upon factors that
the Court has identified as being relevant, like youthfulness or police tactics,
and the Court must decide which way the factors play. These are the cases
where we can start to see how the Justices define voluntariness based on
their underlying assumptions about the suspect who is being interrogated.
Consider, for instance, the case of Fare v. Michael C. The defendant was
a sixteen-year-old who had been arrested on suspicion of murder and in
response to his Miranda warnings requested to have his probation officer
present during the interrogation.22 After the officers denied the request, the
defendant waived his Miranda rights and the Court needed to decide if the
waiver was voluntary. 23 While Justice Blackmun for the majority
acknowledged that the defendant’s juvenile status was relevant to the
voluntariness inquiry, he sketched a portrait of an already hardened offender
who knew his way around the criminal justice system. 24 The defendant,
Justice Blackmun observed, was “16 ½ years old” with a record of previous
offenses “stretching back over several years” and had been on probation
since age 12.25 The majority opinion repeatedly noted that the defendant
was an “experienced older juvenile with an extensive prior record” who had
“considerable experience with the police” because of multiple arrests.26 In
addition, he had spent time in a youth camp and “was under full-time
supervision of probation authorities.”27 The opinion notes in passing that he
wept at one point in the interrogation, but makes nothing of it, instead
20.
Brown, 297 U.S. at 284.
21.
Id. at 282 (quoting Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470 (1935) (Griffith, J., dissenting)).
22.
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 709–11 (1979).
23.
Id. at 715.
24.
Id. at 713 (referencing the California Court of Appeals’ description of the defendant as a “16
and a half year old minor who has been through the court system before, has been to [probation] camp,
has a probation officer, [and is not] a young, naive minor with no experience with the courts.”) (quoting
In re Michael C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765 (Ct. App. 1977)).
25.
Id. at 710, 726–27.
26.
Id. at 725–26.
27.
Id. at 726.
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commending the police for taking “care to inform [him] of his rights and to
ensure that he understood them. The officers did not intimidate or threaten
[him] in any way.” 28 For the majority, Michael was no Oliver Twist
inadvertently caught up in the system, but an already hardened criminal who
knew the ropes of the criminal justice system.
After reading the majority’s opinion, one might wonder just who Justice
Powell was talking about in his dissent. Justice Powell eschewed the
majority’s repeated use of the term “juvenile” with its implicit connotations
of delinquency in the criminal context. Instead, Justice Powell described
Michael as a “young person” who was just “16 years old at the time”
(feeling no need to add the extra one-half year that Justice Blackmun
repeatedly included).29 While Justice Powell acknowledged that Michael
had “prior brushes with the law” (compared to the majority’s “extensive
prior record”), he came across during the interrogation as “immature,
emotional, and uneducated, and therefore was likely to be vulnerable to the
skillful, two-on-one, repetitive style of interrogation to which he was
subjected.”30
Powell expressly observed that he fully believed that a minor could
become a “‘street-wise,’ hardened criminal[],” 31 but the defendant, who
could be heard “crying” 32 while being subjected to “protracted
interrogation,”33 was not that person. Powell strongly disputed the idea that
the officers had taken “‘the greatest care’ to assure that [his] ‘admission was
voluntary.’”34 In short, Powell looked at the same factual sketching of the
defendant, but where Blackmun saw a street-wise juvenile offender,
Powell’s viewing angle saw a scared, tearful youth unable to withstand
police pressures.
Michael C., however, is more than simply a vivid illustration of how
Justices can view the same fact pattern so differently. The case offers an
avenue that we can begin to follow as a way to understand how the Justices
utilize unstated assumptions about human behavior in making their
voluntariness assessments. Whether one dismisses a sixteen-year-old’s
crying while being interrogated as irrelevant or sees it as a sign of a young
person crumbling under pressure will depend on who we see when we look
at the defendant: a hardened street tough or someone trying to act tough
while knowing he needs help.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 727.
Id. at 733 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 734 n.4.
Id. at 733 n.2.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 734 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967)).
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This same basic principle is at work when we look at police questioning
generally. For while some assumptions will undoubtedly turn on a case’s
unique facts, if we step back and look at how the Court’s jurisprudence
concerning police questioning has evolved over time, we see how the
Justices have used various broadly ingrained assumptions about human
nature in trying to answer the voluntariness question. Once we accept that
the voluntariness issue is far more than a question of historical fact, we can
track how the Court has used differing assumptions about how citizens
behave—or should behave—when questioned by the police, as a means of
getting a more accurate sense of how the voluntariness puzzle is put
together. While the analysis does not offer an indisputable answer to how
the Court should decide such cases, it provides a map that makes the Court’s
twisting path through the terrain of police interrogation far more intelligible.
II. THE RUGGED INDIVIDUAL AND POLICE INTERROGATION
A. Introducing the Rugged Individual
That the Court would develop two competing views of who was being
questioned in the interrogation room was not immediately evident from its
early voluntariness cases. Treading gingerly because of federalism concerns
as it started to apply the Due Process Clause to the states, the cases providing
relief tended to involve tactics so extreme, like the whippings in Brown,35
that even an individual with the sternest constitution would have been likely
to crack. Likewise, in Chambers v. Florida, 36 a 1940 case set in rural
Florida, the tactics used were so coercive that even the hardiest individual
would have trouble convincing himself that he could have resisted.37
While the Chambers court noted that “conflicting” claims existed over
whether physical violence and threats were used, 38 the evidence
unambiguously showed that against a backdrop of threatened mob violence,
the petitioners, three Black men suspected of murdering an elderly white
man, had been subjected to almost a week of continuous, intensive
35.
See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
36.
309 U.S. 227, 230–31 (1940) (describing days of intense police questioning).
37.
Although one must take a very long pause after making that statement and recall that juries
had found the confessions in both Brown and Chambers to be voluntary, and those findings had been
upheld by the Mississippi and Florida Supreme Courts. Id. at 227 n.2 (describing Chambers’ guilty
verdict in a jury trial and the procedural steps toward the Supreme Court); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 279 (1936) (recounting that the jury received instructions that if they had reasonable doubt
regarding the voluntariness of the confession, they should disregard the confession). The lower court
cases are thus vivid reminders how important the evaluator’s perspective is: one person’s torture is
another person’s enhanced interrogation.
38.
Chambers, 309 U.S. at 231 (“The testimony is in conflict as to whether all four petitioners
were continually threatened and physically mistreated until they finally, in hopeless desperation and fear
of their lives, agreed to confess on Sunday morning just after daylight.”).
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interrogation without access to friends or family—let alone counsel.39 Each
suspect would be brought up “one by one” in shifts to a room on the fourth
floor of the jail and be surrounded by “four to ten” law enforcement and
community members, all of whom were white, and subjected to intensive
questioning. After five days without a confession, the police decided to
conduct an “all night vigil” that began at three on a Saturday afternoon and,
with only short breaks interspersed for food, finally wrested “sunrise
confessions” from the petitioners early Sunday morning. 40 As the
unanimous Court noted, these were “circumstances calculated to break the
strongest nerves and the stoutest resistance.”41
Both Brown and Chambers were thus relatively easy cases in which to
find involuntariness given the extreme tactics used: one need not delve
deeply into the human psyche to conclude that even the citizen with the
“strongest nerves” would have submitted to the police’s will. Two cases in
the years immediately following, however, introduce us to how the Court
can posit the defendant as “the rugged individual”—someone with a strong
constitutional and personal resolve who knows her rights and possesses the
courage to exercise them unafraid of the consequences42—as the benchmark
for assessing whether the interrogation techniques would have coerced the
confession. 43 Not surprisingly, if the suspect is imagined as the rugged
individual, the Court is much more likely to find that the suspect’s
confession was voluntary.
In Lisenba v. California, 44 decided only a year after Chambers, the
defendant, a suspect in the murder of his wife, was subjected to prolonged
bouts of interrogation by a rotating group of interrogators. Both parties
agreed that Lisenba was deprived of sleep during the first forty-two hours
of his arrest (during which he did not confess) and that eleven days later he
was subjected to another marathon session of about sixteen hours. Despite
requests for his lawyer, the sessions were all incommunicado. The degree
of physical abuse was disputed, but at a minimum, one of the interrogators
39.
Id. at 231–236 (describing the lengthy and intensive interrogation).
40.
Id. at 230, 231, 235.
41.
Id. at 238–39.
42.
For an explication of the “rugged individual” as a product of American history and culture,
see Scott E. Sundby, The Rugged Individual's Guide to the Fourth Amendment: How the Court’s
Idealized Citizen Shapes, Influences, and Excludes the Exercise of Constitutional Rights, 65 UCLA L.
REV. 690 (2018). Professor Bennet Capers has written a fascinating essay that raises through the “good
citizen” a number of parallel points to how the Court’s decisions are based on its perception of how a
citizen should behave. I. Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 653 (2018). Particularly important for this Article is his point that the Court has created a construct
through the “good citizen” that has made it extremely difficult for a citizen to exercise his or her
constitutional rights. Id.
43.
Sundby, supra note 42 at 694–95.
44.
314 U.S. 219 (1941).
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slapped Lisenba’s ear hard enough to leave it red and swollen, with Lisenba
claiming far more extensive abuse.
What is striking about the majority’s opinion is that it is full of strong
admonishments to law enforcement:
[W]e disapprove the violations of law involved in the treatment of
the petitioner . . . . Officers of the law must realize that if they indulge
in such practices [like prolonged interrogation and denying advice of
counsel] they may, in the end, defeat, rather than further, the ends of
justice. Their lawless practices here took them close to the line.45
Yet despite the lecture, the majority saw Lisenba as the rugged individual,
noting at the outset that Lisenba “while having almost no formal education,
is a man of intelligence and business experience.” 46 Even more so, the
majority felt that off the cold record it could confidently determine that
Lisenba had
exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an acumen throughout his
questioning, and at his trial, which negatives the view that he had so
lost his freedom of action that the statements made were not his but
were the result of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny,
or to refuse to answer.47
As it turns out, Lisenba’s ability to act the rugged individual paled
compared to that of the petitioner in Lyons v. Oklahoma. 48 Lyons was
suspected of murdering a father, mother, and four-year-old child, and then
burning their house down to conceal the crime.49 The police conducted three
interrogation sessions. Lyons alleged physical abuse during each
questioning, and although the police denied the allegations, the Court
appeared to be skeptical of the state’s denial.50 Lyons did not confess until
the second interrogation, which involved “[e]leven or twelve officials”
crowded around Lyons in the prosecutor’s cramped office, and went on for
hours through the night until he finally confessed at two thirty in the

45.
Id. at 240.
46.
Id. at 229.
47.
Id. at 241. By contrast, Justice Black, who we will see was no friend of the rugged individual
view, see infra notes 101–14 and accompanying text, observed in his dissent that when Lisenba was
asked if he knew his statement could be used against him, he simply replied, “I didn’t know whether the
statement would be used against me, or not. I would rather die than to have gone back to that house and
went through torture like the three days I was out there. I didn’t care whether the statement was taken,
or not.” Id. at 243 n.2 (Black, J., dissenting). As in the other cases from this era, the majority opinion
stressed federalism concerns in being cautious in reviewing state court judgments. Id. at 238–39.
48.
322 U.S. 596 (1944).
49.
Id. at 598.
50.
Id. at 599.
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morning. 51 The confession came after a pan of the victims’ bones were
placed in his lap52 and he was told “[t]here’s the bones of the baby you
burned up.”53
However, apparently recognizing the egregiousness of this confession,
the State did not introduce it at trial. The prosecution instead relied on a
confession obtained during a third interrogation twelve hours later. As with
all the interrogations, the use of force was disputed and the jury found the
confession to be voluntary despite testimony from the murder victim’s
relatives that the lead state investigator had told them he had beat Lyons
“for either six or seven hours . . . . I haven’t even got to go to bed.” 54
Intriguingly, despite the gruesome nature of the crimes, the jury sentenced
Lyons to life instead of giving him the death penalty, suggesting lingering
doubts about his guilt and treatment by law enforcement.55
Justice Reed, for a six-Justice majority, affirmed the state courts’
findings that the admitted confession was voluntary. 56 Reed provided a
remarkably antiseptic description of Lyons: “married;” “twenty-one or two
years of age;” “from the transcript . . . no indication of subnormal
intelligence” (Lyons, Reed noted, was able to sign his name to the
confession); and two prior convictions, “one for chicken stealing and one
for burglary.”57 With this bland, unremarkable portrayal of the defendant,
Reed was willing to find that the State had produced sufficient evidence
“which, if believed, would make it abundantly clear that the events at [the
coerced confession] did not bring about the [later] confession.”58
Reed proceeded to detail the evidence that he thought showed the first
confession had not influenced the second, including that the second
confession was “a full twelve hours” after the involuntary confession, that
the second confession was at a different location, and that all but one of the
interrogators from the first confession were different.59 Reed believed these
factors allowed him to find that this rugged individual of normal
intelligence—who could even sign his name—would have been able to put
aside the brutalities of the first confession. Reed also provided a rationale

51.
Id.
52.
Id. at 599–600.
53.
The officer’s statement does not appear in the Supreme Court opinion but is reported by
Gilbert King, The Awakening of Thurgood Marshall, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 20, 2014, 11:56
AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/11/20/the-awakening-of-thurgood-marshall.
54.
Id. The jury found that the confession was not physically coerced and the majority acquiesced
to that finding. Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Lyons, 322 U.S. at 605.
57.
Id. at 599.
58.
Id. at 604.
59.
Id.

2020]

THE COURT AND THE SUSPECT

135

for Lyons’ confession that is often used 60 in explaining the rugged
individual’s decision to confess: Lyons, after rationally weighing the pros
and cons, had determined that “it was wise to make a clean breast of his
guilt.”61
Even without knowing more, one might already be inclined to agree with
dissenting Justice Murphy’s disbelief of the majority’s psychological
analysis:
[I]t is inconceivable . . . that the second confession was free from the
coercive atmosphere that admittedly impregnated the first one. The
whole confession technique used here constituted one single,
continuing transaction. To conclude that the brutality inflicted at the
time of the first confession suddenly lost all of its effect in the short
space of twelve hours is to close one’s eyes to the realities of human
nature.62
The reader’s incredulity will no doubt increase upon learning that, despite
Reed’s portrayal of Lyons as an everyday citizen, he was in fact an illiterate
“black sharecropper” who the police arrested only after releasing two other
individuals whose prosecution would have potentially escalated into a
scandal implicating local prison officials.63 Remarkably, Lyons’ race was
never mentioned in the Supreme Court’s opinion even though it was part of
the case’s dynamic.64 Indeed, Lyons’ attorney at trial and on appeal was
Special Counsel to the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Thurgood Marshall—
fresh off his victory in Chambers and confident that Lyons would win in the
Supreme Court.65
As Marshall angrily discovered,66 however, if the Court uses the rugged
individual as the measure of a suspect’s resiliency during interrogation, the
effect can be to posit an individual who can “easily forget the . . . torture
that accompanied [Lyons’] previous refusal to confess” and allow that
person to “quickly recover from the gruesome effects of having had a pan
of human bones placed on his knees in order to force incriminating
testimony from him.”67 That revelation may help explain why after Marshall
60.
See infra Part IV.A.
61.
Lyons, 322 U.S. at 604.
62.
Id. at 606 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
63.
King, supra note 53.
64.
As will be seen, the rugged individual archetype has a disproportionate impact on minority
defendants. See infra notes 216–217 and accompanying text. See also Sundby, supra note 42 at 723–27
(discussing how the rugged individual perspective negatively impacts minority citizens trying to claim
Fourth Amendment protections).
65.
King, supra note 53.
66.
Id. (“The decision, which Marshall openly criticized in a rare display of anger, amplified for
him the harrowing and tenuous position of placing a client’s fate in the hands of the Supreme Court.”).
67.
Lyons, 322 U.S. at 606 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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took his seat on the Court, he would resist so strongly the rugged individual
approach and become one of the strongest advocates for an alternative
vision of the citizen who is subjected to interrogation.68
B. How the Rugged Individual Archetype Turns Voluntariness into a
Special Circumstances Inquiry
What is critical to recognize at the outset is the fundamental effect that
the rugged individual approach has on how the voluntariness inquiry is
framed: the starting assumption is that a suspect as the rugged individual
ordinarily will be able to withstand the pressures inherent to interrogation,
and any confession will be presumed voluntary absent either extreme
techniques or particular individual vulnerabilities. From the rugged
individual perspective, therefore, Brown and Chambers can be
compartmentalized as exceptions based on the suspects’ particular
vulnerabilities and the extreme methods used.69 Each case took place in the
Jim Crow South during a time of overt and often brutal racial discrimination
in the criminal justice system, with lynching always lurking in the
background as an instrument of terror.70 The Brown Court noted as part of
its involuntariness analysis that the suspects were “ignorant negroes”71 and
the Chambers Court thought it critical that the “protracted questioning and
cross questioning of these ignorant young colored tenant farmers [was
carried out] by State officers and other white citizens.”72
This focus on a suspect’s particular vulnerabilities was carried forward
in a line of cases developed over time where the Court found confessions to
be involuntary because they were produced through police exploitation of a
suspect’s unique situation. The Court found confessions to be involuntary,
for instance, where: the suspect was a young heroin addict and a “near
mental defective;” 73 where a sleep-deprived suspect was tricked into
68.
See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 682 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (opposing
the creation of a “public safety” exception to Miranda, a decision he described as “the culmination of a
century-long inquiry into how this Court should deal with confessions made during custodial
interrogations”). Professors Green and Richman are no doubt correct that even though Marshall in his
opinions addressing Miranda issues did not directly cast Miranda as a civil liberties decision addressing
race and poverty disparities, that factor was always inescapably present. Bruce A. Green & Daniel
Richman, Of Laws and Men: An Essay on Justice Marshall’s View of Criminal Procedure, 26 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 369, 388 n.75 (1994).
69.
See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
70.
Chambers was represented in the Supreme Court by Thurgood Marshall, Jr., as Special
Counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. King, supra note 53 (“[Marshall] had, in fact, already
argued and won Chambers v. Florida before the Supreme Court, which ruled unanimously that coerced
confessions by police are inadmissible at trial.”).
71.
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281 (1936).
72.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238 (1940).
73.
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 303 (1963).
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thinking he was talking to a doctor for a medical condition, when in fact he
was being subjected to the “arts of a highly skilled psychiatrist” trained in
hypnosis to obtain a “trance-like” confession after extensive questioning;74
where a suspect was actively psychotic and incompetent at the time of the
confession;75 where a Black defendant in a Deep South case full of racial
animus was subjected to prolonged interrogation, including threats to arrest
his mother on unrelated charges if he did not confess;76 and where a mother
was told that “state financial aid for her infant children would be cut off,
and her children taken from her, if she did not ‘cooperate.’”77
All of these cases are in one sense unremarkable and commonsensical.
No one is going to be surprised that the police manipulating an individual’s
unique vulnerability is a factor that a court will focus on in finding a
confession involuntary. However, these cases also have an unstated
analytical side-effect that is far more controversial and deserving of being
pulled out of the shadows: they can be seen as entrenching the presumption
that the average citizen78 is made of sufficiently hardy material that, absent
such special circumstances, the police could turn the screw fairly far before
the citizen would succumb to the pressures of police interrogation.
From this perspective, these voluntariness cases are reminiscent of the
Court’s discarded “special circumstances” test for deciding if an accused
had a constitutional right to an appointed attorney. 79 Prior to Gideon v.
Wainwright,80 the Court presumed that the average citizen was quite capable
of defending himself in a criminal proceeding and, therefore, no automatic
74.
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561 (1954). After his first trial, the state supreme court
reversed his conviction upon finding the confession to the psychiatrist involuntary. He was tried and
convicted again, however, based on a series of subsequent confessions he had given to the police in the
immediate aftermath following the confession to the psychiatrist. It was these confessions the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled also involuntary because they “[a]ll were simply parts of one continuous process.”
Id.
75.
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
76.
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949).
77.
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
78.
And if the defendant is educated, such as a law student, the presumption will be all the
stronger. In Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), the Court found that that the defendant’s claim
of involuntariness:
is negated . . . by petitioner’s age, intelligence, and education. While in law school he had
studied criminal law; indeed, when asked to take the lie detector test, he informed the operator
that the results of such a test would not be admissible at trial absent a stipulation by the parties.
Supplementing that background is the police statement to petitioner well before his confession
that he did not have to answer questions. Moreover, the manner of his refusals to answer
indicates full awareness of the right to be silent. On this record we are unable to say that
petitioner’s confession was anything other than voluntary.
Id. at 438.
79.
See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) (“That which may, in one setting, constitute a
denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances,
and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.”).
80.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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constitutional right existed to have an attorney appointed if he could not
afford one. 81 A Due Process violation occurred only if a special
circumstance existed like intellectual disability that would have precluded
the accused from being able to live up to the Court’s myth that the average
citizen was a worthy match for a professional prosecutor. Led by Justice
Black, the Court eventually acknowledged that the “science of the law” was
beyond the ken of non-lawyers and in Gideon abandoned the special
circumstances test by finding that fundamental fairness required that
defendants were entitled to an appointed attorney if they were indigent.82
Like the special circumstances test, the voluntariness cases—if cast as
primarily focusing on the suspect’s “special vulnerabilities”—can also be
used to severely limit findings of involuntariness to only those extreme
situations where even the most constitutionally courageous individual
would have been unable to stand up to the police. And as Lyons shows, if
the suspect must show how he was uniquely vulnerable, the voluntariness
analysis can be readily skewed by either ignoring or downplaying such
vulnerabilities, as the majority did by never noting that Lyons was an
uneducated Black sharecropper in Oklahoma in the 1940s.83
This restrictive view of voluntariness, however, like the special
circumstances test for appointment of counsel, was also eventually
challenged as not reflective of reality. And fittingly, it was Justice Black
who, just as he had in Gideon,84 was a prime mover in arguing that the
rugged individual was not a realistic portrayal of the average citizen who
found herself in the interrogation room.85 This very different understanding
of human nature set the stage for Miranda and introduced into the Court’s
interrogation jurisprudence a very different perspective, that of the
susceptible individual, through which to view police interrogation practices.

81.
Id. at 342 (declaring that the right to counsel is a fundamental right and must be applied to
the states).
82.
See Betts, 316 U.S. at 472 (“[T]he accused was not helpless, but was a man forty-three years
old, of ordinary intelligence and ability to take care of his own interests on the trial of that narrow
issue.”).
83.
See supra notes 54–65 and accompanying text.
84.
See Sundby, supra note 42, at 739–45 (describing Justice Black’s role in showing that the
special circumstances test for the appointment of counsel was an unrealistic standard).
85.
See infra notes 101–14 and accompanying text.
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III. THE “EASILY SEDUCED” MIND AND THE SUSCEPTIBLE INDIVIDUAL
“The human mind, under the pressure of calamity, is easily seduced . .
. .”86
A. The Rugged Individual Finds an Alterego
As seen in the prior section, one way to understand the Court’s
voluntariness cases is as establishing a baseline assumption that a citizen
confronted with police interrogation will act like the rugged individual with
the “ability to resist and to admit, deny, or refuse to answer,” even though
standard interrogation practices are “admit[tedly] . . . ‘inherently
coercive.’” 87 From the rugged individual viewpoint, therefore, the cases
where the Court found a confession to be involuntary are understood as
situations where the defendant because of a particular attribute (e.g.,
psychosis or intellectual disability) could not rise to the role of the rugged
individual, or because the tactics used were so excessive (such as week-long
interrogations or physical violence) that even the rugged individual could
not have withstood them. From this perspective, a court looking at an
“ordinary” interrogation starts with the presumption that the suspect was
quite capable of asserting his or her rights and withstanding police
pressures, and will only find the involuntariness switch had been switched
to “on” if something extraordinary occurred (and as Lyons demonstrates,
the emphasis under this approach puts the “extra” in extraordinary).
There is another way to understand the cases, however, and it is a mode
of understanding that ultimately begat Miranda. This view is one that can
be detected as early as the 1897 case of Bram v. United States,88 which in
turn traces back to early English common law. Because it was a federal
prosecution, the Bram Court was operating directly under the Fifth
Amendment command that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal

86.
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 547 (1897) (quoting HENRY HAWKINS, HAWKINS’
PLEAS OF THE CROWN (6th ed. 1787)).
87.
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 170 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also infra notes
148–156 and accompanying text (further discussing Jackson as a prominent advocate of the rugged
individual view of police interrogation); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 239–40 (1941)
(finding confession voluntary despite harsh interrogation tactics and characterizing prior cases finding
involuntariness as going to situations where the confessions “were secured by protracted and repeated
questioning of ignorant and untutored persons in whose minds the power of officers was greatly
magnified; who sensed the adverse sentiment of the community and the danger of mob violence; who
had been held incommunicado, without the advice of friends or of counsel; some of whom had been
taken by officers at night from the prison into dark and lonely places for questioning”).
88.
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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case to be a witness against himself,” 89 but the focus remained on the
question of whether Bram’s confession was “free and voluntary.”90
The case’s facts are literally those of a murder-on-the-high-seas mystery.
Bram was a seaman suspected in the murder of his captain, the captain’s
wife, and the second mate during a voyage. Bram, who took over command
as the next-in-charge, had at first succeeded in casting suspicion on another
sailor, Brown, who was detained onboard.91 But by the time the ship reached
port in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Brown had managed to turn the tables and
Bram was the one in custody.92 After being stripped down for a search of
his clothes, Bram was interrogated by a Halifax detective and, although
denying guilt, made statements that were introduced as part of the
prosecution’s case.93
In finding that Bram’s confession was involuntary, three aspects of the
Bram opinion are particularly important. First, the citizen who the Court
sees the Fifth Amendment as protecting is most certainly not the rugged
individual. Quoting liberally from a variety of English and American
treatises to demonstrate the privilege’s origins and purposes, the Court
paints a picture of the average individual as highly susceptible to police
pressures:
The human mind, under the pressure of calamity, is easily seduced,
and is liable, in the alarm of danger, to acknowledge indiscriminately
a falsehood or a truth, as different agitations may prevail. A
confession, therefore, . . . which is obtained from a defendant, either
by the flattery of hope, or by the impression of fear, however slightly
the emotions may be implanted . . . is not admissible evidence; for the
law will not suffer a prisoner to be made the deluded instrument of

89.
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court would not incorporate the Fifth Amendment privilege
against the states until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court’s willingness to take a far more
expansive view of voluntariness in Bram compared to cases like Chambers and Lyons is at least partly
attributable to the Court’s federalism concerns when reviewing state cases. See, e.g., supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
90.
Bram, 168 U.S. at 557–58 (“[T]he general rule that the confession must be free and voluntary
. . . is settled . . . .”).
91.
Id. at 536.
92.
Id. at 537.
93.
Id. at 561–62 (describing the circumstances under which Bram was questioned). The Court
made short work of the government’s argument that the admission of the statement was not prejudicial
because it did not admit guilt: “Why introduce it at all unless it was to lay a foundation for the
prosecution? The use which was made of the prisoner’s statement precludes the State from saying that
it was not used to his prejudice.” Id. at 542 (quoting State v. Rorie, 74 N.C. 148 (1876)). The Miranda
Court would later make clear that its ruling applied even to statements that were arguably exculpatory.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (ruling applies to “statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory”).
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his own conviction.94
Second, the Court noted that part of the difficulty with the obtaining of
confessions is that it is almost impossible to truly tell whether a confession
is voluntary. Consequently, the statement must be suppressed if any threat
or promise “however slight”95 was employed:
A confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner
has been influenced by any threat or promise; for the law cannot
measure the force of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon
the mind of the prisoner, and therefore excludes the declaration if any
degree of influence has been exerted.96
Finally, the Court was cognizant of the special danger of coercion associated
with a police officer’s interrogation, noting that the English doctrine
underlying the privilege might even be read as saying that “the mere fact of
the interrogation of a prisoner by a police office would per se render the
confession inadmissible, because of the inducement resulting from the very
nature of the authority exercised by the police officer.”97 At a minimum, the
Court concluded,
[t]he attempt on the part of a police officer to obtain a confession by
interrogating has been often reproved by the English courts as unfair
to the prisoner, and as approaching dangerously near to a violation of
the rule protecting an accused from being compelled to testify against
himself.98
In Bram, then, one can begin to see a dramatically different vision of the
citizen claiming constitutional protection when subjected to police
questioning. Unlike the rugged individual, this citizen cannot necessarily
stand up to the police when confronted in an interrogation atmosphere. This
person, whom we will call the “susceptible individual,” is someone who
when faced with the inherent authority of the police in an interrogation
atmosphere is likely to be vulnerable to either threats or promises of hope—
even if innocent. And echoing Judge Posner’s earlier reflections that it is
psychologically impossible to know when a person’s involuntariness switch
94.
Bram, 168 U.S. at 547 (quoting HAWKINS’ PLEAS OF THE CROWN (6th ed. 1787)) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted); see also id. (judges may refuse to record a confession that “proceed[s] from
fear, menace, or duress, or from weakness or ignorance.”) (quoting HAWKINS’ PLEAS OF THE CROWN
(6th ed. 1787)).
95.
Id. at 543.
96.
Id. (quoting 3 H. SMITH & A. KEEP, RUSSELL ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478 (6th ed.
1896)).
97.
Id. at 556 (citing 3 H. SMITH & A. KEEP, RUSSELL ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 510 (6th
ed. 1896)).
98.
Id. at 557.
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magically turns to “on,” 99 the susceptible-individual perspective
acknowledges that “[t]he law cannot measure the force of the influence
used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner” and so
effectively presumes that if inducements were made, the statement was
involuntary.100
Two competing visions of the suspect who is sitting in the interrogation
room thus begin to emerge. As we will see, much of the Court’s
jurisprudence reflects a tug-of-war between these visions and which
archetype—the rugged individual or the susceptible individual—is at any
point ascendant. The susceptible individual archetype reached its zenith in
Miranda, but it was Justice Black who was the most articulate and
passionate advocate of the susceptible individual perspective in setting the
foundation for Miranda. His opinions on voluntariness focused on
portraying the vulnerability of everyday individuals who are subjected to
police interrogation techniques.
Justice Black’s use of the susceptible individual is evident in Ashcraft v.
Tennessee,101 a case decided the same term as Lyons. Ashcraft involved a
defendant who had allegedly confessed102 to killing his wife. The case is
particularly notable because, as Justice Jackson observed in his dissent,
“[t]his is not the case of an ignorant and unrepresented defendant who has
been the victim of prejudice. Ashcraft was a white man of good reputation,
good position, and substantial property.”103
The interrogation Ashcraft underwent—a thirty-six-hour interrogation
during which he was given only a single five-minute respite—is alarming
from a psychological perspective, but it did not involve the brutality, the
racially charged lynch mob atmosphere, or the week-long tag-team
interrogations of the other cases that the Court reviewed during this time
period. In other words, if some Justices were looking for an opportunity to
express concerns over the general effects of intensive interrogation on
“ordinary” suspects, Ashcraft provided such a forum.104
Justice Black, who had written Chambers a few years earlier and
dissented in Lyons,105 sympathetically sketched E.E. Ashworth as a salt-ofthe-earth individual doing his best in a system where the odds were all
stacked in the government’s favor: “[B]orn on an Arkansas farm[,]”
99.
100.

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Bram, 168 U.S at 543 (quoting 3 H. SMITH & A. KEEP, RUSSELL ON CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS 478 (6th ed. 1896)).
101. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
102. Ashcraft actually denied that he had ever confessed and refused to sign a purported transcript
of his statement. Id. at 151–52.
103. Id. at 173 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
104. See supra notes 69–83 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 48–65 and accompanying text.
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Ashcraft had pulled himself up by the bootstraps, leaving at the age of
eleven to become a farmhand, and eventually becoming a “skilled dragline
and steam shovel operator.”106 “[H]e had acquired for himself ‘an excellent
reputation’” and through the dint of hard work had accumulated a home and
some modest bank accounts from which he supported himself and his wife
in a “home life [that] was pleasant and happy.” 107 Yet, as Black relates,
despite the police’s “fail[ure] to unearth one single tangible clue pointing to
his guilt[,]” Ashcraft was taken into custody, placed in a room “equipped
with all sorts of crime and detective devices,” interrogated for thirty-six
hours beneath a high-powered lamp, “during which period he was held
incommunicado, without sleep or rest, [as] relays of officers, experienced
investigators, and highly trained lawyers questioned him without respite.”108
And while Ashcraft and the police described different versions of his
treatment, that was beside the point for Black, because, as he darkly noted,
“[s]uch disputes . . . are an inescapable consequence of secret inquisitorial
practices.”109 And in an effective rhetorical move, Black made Ashcraft the
representative of not just accused murderers, but of individuals everywhere
who the government is trying to break down, arguing that such “secret
inquisitions” are always “weighted against an accused, particularly where,
as here, he is charged with a brutal crime, or where, as in many other cases,
his supposed offense bears relation to an unpopular economic, political, or
religious cause.”110 Most strikingly, Black bluntly declared techniques like
Ashcraft’s prolonged interrogation to be “so inherently coercive that [their]
very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom.”111
Justice Robert Jackson, perhaps the most articulate advocate of the
rugged individual viewpoint, was quick to sense that Justice Black was
trying to shift the voluntariness framework. He observed that:
[T]he Court always has considered the confessor’s strength or
weakness, whether he was educated or illiterate, intelligent or
moronic, well or ill, Negro or white. But the Court refuses in this case
106. Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 148.
107. Id. (quoting the Tennessee Supreme Court).
108. Id. at 149, 153.
109. Id. at 152.
110. Id. at 152–53.
111. Id. at 154 (emphasis added). The State on remand retried Ashcraft using testimony about
what Ashcraft had said during the interrogation instead of the defendant’s own written confession; in
other words, the jury heard everything to which Ashcraft had allegedly confessed although the Supreme
Court had suppressed the confession. In an opinion again written by Justice Black, the Court reversed
once more finding that all the reasons “apply with equal force” for reversal. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327
U.S. 274, 279 (1946). Cf. G. Wayne Dowdy, 1941 Raleigh Murder Case Had National Impact, THE
BEST TIMES, (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.thebesttimes.com/local/raleigh-murder-case-had-national-im
pact/article89451086-942b-11e8-9dc1-1b84a879f030.html [https://perma.cc/356J-HYYY] (noting that
Ashcraft ended up being tried a total of four times before being released from custody).
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to be guided by this test. . . . Instead of finding as a fact that Ashcraft’s
freedom of will was impaired, it substitutes the doctrine that the
situation was “inherently coercive.”112
The effect, the dissent correctly divined, was to create an “irrebuttable
presumption that [prolonged] custody and examination are ‘inherently
coercive’” so that “the constitutional admissibility of a confession is no
longer to be measured by the mental state of the individual confessor but by
general doctrine dependent on the clock.”113 In prescient fashion, Jackson
foresaw where this might lead:
No one can regard the [voluntariness test] dependent on the state of
the individual’s will as an easy one to apply. It leads to controversy,
speculation, and variations in application. To eliminate these evils by
eliminating all confessions made after interrogation while in custody
is a drastic alternative, but it is the logical consequence of today’s
ruling . . . .114
The cases over the two decades following Ashcraft and culminating in
Miranda failed to clearly resolve the tension between the rugged and
susceptible individual templates. The cases were capable of being
understood either as situations where the suspect could not fulfill the rugged
individual’s role because of unique circumstances, or as ones which
acknowledged that the human condition made anyone vulnerable to the
inherent coercion of interrogation.115 This changed, however, with Spano v.
New York,116 a 1959 case that, especially with hindsight, marked a major
turning point toward a majority of the Court adopting the susceptible
individual perspective.
The police were searching for Vincent Spano who had been indicted for
murder based on a retaliatory shooting, and Spano eventually called a
friend, Bruno, who was training to be a police officer.117 Bruno convinced
Spano to obtain a lawyer and turn himself in.118 As Spano turned himself
over to police custody, his lawyer cautioned him to not answer any
questions. 119 Spano was subjected to the now familiar relay-fashion
interrogation by multiple interrogators in the middle of the night, but the
prolonged session lasted eight hours, compared to the thirty-six hours in
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 162 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 158, 162.
Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
See cases discussed supra notes 69–85.
360 U.S. 315 (1959).
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id.
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Ashcraft, let alone the week-long ordeal in Chambers. And while the Court
noted that Spano was foreign-born, he had largely grown up in the United
States and was twenty-five years of age. 120 He had dropped out of high
school in his freshman year and some evidence existed of emotional and
mental instability, but he was employed and had not been in trouble with
the law before.121
The police behavior was not exemplary, but it was not flagrantly
egregious when compared to prior cases. In addition to the eight-hour
interrogation session, the police ignored Spano’s repeated refusal to answer
questions and his requests to talk to his attorney, even telling him they could
not find his lawyer’s number in the phone directory (a fact the Court wryly
called a “mystery” given that the lawyer’s name was readily found in the
directory). 122 There were, however, no allegations of physical abuse or
threats. In short, it is hard to imagine under the earlier cases that Spano
would have been seen as incapable of living up to the rugged individual
ideal.
Yet the Court found Spano’s confession to be involuntary. Chief Justice
Warren was particularly troubled by the interrogators’ use of his friend,
Bruno, the officer-in-training.123 Bruno was instructed by his superiors to
go in and lie to Spano by telling him that Bruno was in trouble for having
helped Spano and that for the sake of Bruno’s “pregnant wife and three
children” he needed to confess. 124 It took four different attempts, but
eventually the ploy worked, a tactic that Chief Justice Warren stressed in
finding involuntariness:
And Bruno played th[e] part of a worried father, harried by his
superiors, in not one, but four different acts, the final one lasting an
hour. Petitioner was apparently unaware of John Gay's famous
couplet:
“An open foe may prove a curse,
But a pretended friend is worse,”
and he yielded to his false friend’s entreaties.
We conclude that petitioner's will was overborne by official
pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused after considering all
the facts . . . .125
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 321.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 317–18, 318 n.1.
Id. at 323 (describing how Spano “yielded to his false friend’s entreaties”).
Id. at 319.
Id. at 323 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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The Court’s reliance on “sympathy falsely aroused” as a critical factor
in finding the defendant’s will to have been broken is a far cry from a case
like Lyons where the Court posited the suspect would have been able to
shake off the effects of having a pan of the victim’s charred bones thrust
onto his lap. 126 Indeed, the Spano Court acknowledged that the Court’s
approach had evolved over how it approached the question of whether one’s
will was broken:
The facts of no case recently in this Court have quite approached the
brutal beatings in Brown . . . or the 36 consecutive hours of
questioning present in Ashcraft . . . . But as law enforcement officers
become more responsible, and the methods used to extract
confessions more sophisticated, our duty to enforce federal
constitutional protections does not cease. It only becomes more
difficult because of the more delicate judgments to be made.127
Unsurprisingly, as the Court increasingly adopted the susceptible
individual perspective, it also became more open to the idea that procedural
barriers needed to be erected to protect the citizen who was being
interrogated. In Spano, four Justices expressly would have held that, at least
after charges have been filed, a constitutional right to a lawyer during
interrogation existed:
What followed the petitioner's surrender in this case was not
arraignment in a court of law, but an all-night inquisition . . . .
Throughout the night the petitioner repeatedly asked to be allowed to
send for his lawyer, and his requests were repeatedly denied. He
finally was induced to make a confession. That confession was used
to secure a verdict sending him to the electric chair.
Our Constitution guarantees the assistance of counsel to a man on
trial for his life in an orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge,
open to the public, and protected by all the procedural safeguards of
the law. Surely a Constitution which promises that much can
vouchsafe no less to the same man under midnight inquisition in the
squad room of a police station.128

126. Id.
127. Id. at 321 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id. at 325 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“This is a
case of an accused, who is scheduled to be tried by a judge and jury, being tried in a preliminary way by
the police. This is a kangaroo court procedure whereby the police produce the vital evidence in the form
of a confession which is useful or necessary to obtain a conviction. They in effect deny him effective
representation by counsel.”).
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Spano thus helped set the stage for Miranda’s debut with a Court that not
only was increasingly considering procedural protections that would help
pierce the secrecy of the “midnight inquisition,” 129 but that also was
increasingly casting the citizen being interrogated not as the rugged
individual, but as a psychologically vulnerable person susceptible to the
interrogator’s practices.
B. Miranda v. Arizona: The Susceptible Individual Archetype Triumphant
As can now be seen, while Miranda was revolutionary in turning to the
Fifth Amendment privilege as the source for the now-famous Miranda
warnings, 130 the essence of its holding—the full embracing of the
susceptible individual perspective—can be readily traced back through
Spano, Ashcraft and all the way to Bram.131 But to close the circle on the
argument for preemptive measures to protect the citizen, Chief Justice
Warren still needed to make the case that every citizen needed upfront
protections.
Warren did so by examining what we can call the “science of
interrogation”132 as a way of demonstrating why the privilege against selfincrimination needed to be far more difficult to waive, even for the hardiest
rugged individual. For six pages, Warren famously detailed the techniques
found in interrogation training manuals to demonstrate how these
“menacing police interrogation procedures” relying on psychology rather
than the “third degree” enabled “the police . . . [to] persuade, trick, or cajole
129. The concern over greater procedural protections went beyond the right to counsel and had
been building up momentum even prior to Spano. Justice Douglas, for example, in his concurrence in
Watts v. Indiana, wrote:
It would be naive to think that this protective custody was less than the inquisition. The man
was held until he broke. Then and only then was he arraigned and given the protection which
the law provides all accused. Detention without arraignment is a time-honored method for
keeping an accused under the exclusive control of the police. They can then operate at their
leisure. The accused is wholly at their mercy. He is without the aid of counsel or friends; and
he is denied the protection of the magistrate. We should unequivocally condemn the procedure
and stand ready to outlaw . . . any confession obtained during the period of the unlawful
detention. The procedure breeds coerced confessions. It is the root of the evil. It is the procedure
without which the inquisition could not flourish in the country.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
130. In Miranda, the Court noted that it granted certiorari to provide further guidance after its
decision two years earlier in Escobedo v. Illinois. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440–42 (1966).
Escobedo was a half-step toward protecting the individual’s constitutionally-guaranteed rights during
police interrogations, albeit only through the Sixth Amendment. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964)
131. See supra Part III.A.
132. Warren’s rhetorical strategy is reminiscent of Justice Black’s approach in arguing for the
right to counsel by invoking the idea that there existed a “science of law” that “[e]ven the intelligent and
educated layman” would not understand, and therefore would “lack[] both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defence.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
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[the suspect] out of exercising his constitutional rights.”133 And critically to
Warren’s mission of making the opinion’s protections attach to all suspects
undergoing a custodial interrogation, even for those whom the Court earlier
would have cast as the rugged individual, the majority opinion stressed that
“[i]t is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an
interrogator’s imprecations.” 134 Consequently, the majority required
Miranda warnings to be given “whatever the background of the person
interrogated” lest the privilege become a mere “form of words.” 135
While Warren did not go as far as those who argued that a suspect must
first meet with an attorney before being allowed to waive his privilege,136
the opinion did attempt to structure the process so that the default position
was that the privilege was in effect unless the state could affirmatively prove
waiver:
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney
and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel. . . .
. . . [A] valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence
of the accused after warnings are given . . . .
. . . [T]he fact of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado
incarceration before a statement is made is strong evidence that the
accused did not validly waive his rights. . . . Moreover, any evidence
that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will,
of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his
privilege.137
Given the inherent pressures that the majority saw as bearing on the
individual to speak, the opinion also attempted to make it as easy as possible
for the individual to invoke the privilege:
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
133. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449–55, 457.
134. Id. at 468.
135. Id. at 444, 469. Interestingly, an argument that the pressures can be so great as to lead the
rugged individual to confess despite his innocence—a danger that DNA exonerations have shown occur
far more often than commonly assumed—received relatively cursory treatment in a footnote, no doubt
because in 1966 the phenomenon of false confessions was thought quite rare. Id. at 455 n.24 (observing
that “[i]nterrogation procedures may even give rise to a false confession” and giving a brief description
of one such case and noting “two other instances” where a false confession had occurred). See infra
notes 253–270 and accompanying text (detailing how DNA testing has shown false confessions to be a
far more serious problem that previously assumed by the courts).
136. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 739–740 (1992).
137. Miranda, 384 U.S at 475–76.
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during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation
must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his
Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after . . . cannot be
other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.138
And anticipating that the science of interrogation might adapt to the
Miranda warnings and simply make them part of the interrogation process,
Warren even tried to initiate a preemptive strike by declaring that “[t]he
requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect
to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to
existing methods of interrogation.”139
As we now know,140 Chief Justice Warren was prescient in his concerns
that police would adapt to and incorporate the Miranda warnings into their
interrogation techniques so that the Court’s efforts to immunize the incustody suspect from pressures would be diluted. Indeed, by the time
Miranda’s constitutional basis was reconsidered in Dickerson v. United
States 141 thirty-four years later, law enforcement had largely learned to
adapt to Miranda142 despite their initial hue and cry when the case was first
decided,143 and to even embrace it for the certainty the holding provided.144
Just how diluted Miranda’s impact had become can perhaps be seen in the
fact that despite his long history as a harsh Miranda critic,145 it was Chief
Justice Rehnquist who wrote the Dickerson opinion that allowed Miranda
138. Id. at 473–74.
139. Id. at 476.
140. See infra Part IV.
141. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
142. See id. at 443. (“We do not think there is such justification for overruling Miranda. Miranda
has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture.”). Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 455–60
(1987); Kit Kinports, supra note 4; Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern
Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 433–
37 (1999). Of course, one person’s adaption may be another person’s circumvention, see Kamisar, supra
note 6, at 186 (contending that “‘circumventing,’ ‘evading,’ or ‘disregarding’” are “more accurate” terms
than “‘[a]dapting’ or ‘adjusting’”).
143. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 516–24 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the ways in which the
majority’s holding would frustrate law enforcement, reduce confessions, and obtain little offsetting
benefit).
144. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT (1991) (observing that law enforcement officials “learned to live with Miranda, and even to
love it, to the extent that it provided them with a safe harbor”).
145. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (carving out a public safety exception
for Miranda warning); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (raising the threshold for voluntary
confessions by requiring a showing of coercive police conduct and lowering the burden of proof on the
state to show waiver by a preponderance of the evidence); see also Victor Li, Think You Have the Right?
The 50-Year Story of the Miranda Warning Has the Twists and Turns of A Cop Show, 102 ABA J. 34
(Aug. 2016) (detailing Justice Rehnquist’s criticisms of Miranda before his opinion reaffirming the
decision in Dickerson); Yale Kamisar, Miranda’s Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared the Landmark
Confession Case, but Weakened Its Impact, 92 A.B.A. J. 48 (June 2006).
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to survive its near-death constitutional moment. 146 While Rehnquist’s
defense of Miranda is extremely tepid, exuding all the enthusiasm of a
twelve-year-old going to etiquette class on a sunny Saturday afternoon, he
was able to live with the decision because the rugged individual in the
decades after Miranda had regained a dominant position within the Court’s
interrogation decisions.
IV. THE RUGGED INDIVIDUAL’S RESURRECTION: RATIONALIZING
CONFESSIONS THROUGH THE CALCULATING AND PENITENT SUSPECTS
Even during the run up to Miranda there were, as we have seen, 147
Justices who had argued that the rugged individual was sufficiently hardy
that if he wanted constitutional protections, he needed to claim them. Recall
that Justice Jackson in his Ashcraft dissent had strongly objected to Black’s
suggestion that prolonged questioning would have broken the will of any
person subjected to the thirty-six-hour interrogation. 148 Jackson believed
that “some men would withstand for days pressures that would destroy the
will of another in hours[,]”149 and that the facts indicated to Jackson that
Ashcraft’s “strength of character” would have enabled him to resist the
interrogators if he had wanted.150 From Jackson’s perspective, if Ashcraft
failed to resist the interrogation techniques, he had no one to blame but
himself: “He did not throw himself at any time on his rights, refuse to
answer, and demand counsel, even according to his own testimony.”151
To Jackson’s credit, he candidly acknowledged that in a pure sense, “[t]o
speak of any confessions of crime made after arrest as being ‘voluntary’ or
‘uncoerced’ is somewhat inaccurate, although traditional.” 152 Rather,
Jackson explained, “‘[v]oluntary confessions’ in criminal law are the
product of calculations of a different order, and usually proceed from a
belief that further denial is useless and perhaps prejudicial.” 153 The
question, therefore, for Jackson was not whether the interrogation that
occurred in Ashcraft was “‘inherently coercive.’ Of course it is. And so is
146. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 428.
147. See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text.
148. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 161 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 162.
150. Id. at 171. In a footnote, Jackson also painted a far less flattering picture of Ashcraft:
The officers had been baffled as to any motive for Ashcraft to murder his wife (who was his
third, two former ones having been separated from him by divorce). He disclosed in his
confession to them that her sickness had resulted in a degree of irritability which had made
them incompatible and resulted in his sexual frustration.
Id. at 166 n.1.
151. Id. at 169.
152. Id. at 161.
153. Id.
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[even] custody and examination for one hour. . . . Of course such acts put
pressure upon the prisoner to answer questions, to answer them truthfully,
and to confess if guilty.”154 But so long as the interrogation did not “pass[]
the individual’s ability to resist and to admit, deny, or refuse to answer[,]”
the confession was voluntary despite the inherent pressure and
coerciveness. 155 In short, Jackson concluded with intriguing religious
overtones, “[a] confession is wholly and incontestably voluntary only if a
guilty person gives himself up to the law.”156
Those arguing that the rugged individual has the resilience to resist
ordinary interrogation pressures, however, still must answer a critical
question: Why would the rugged individual ever “give himself up to the
law” where the consequence is criminal liability? Or, in other words, is not
the fact that someone confesses to a criminal act itself evidence of
Miranda’s claim of overbearing coercion? Those Justices who have argued
that Miranda underestimates the rugged individual have relied on two
answers to explain why the rugged individual might “voluntarily” confess:
a mistaken reliance on his ability to outsmart the police and a desire to take
a step towards redemption.
A. Giving One’s Self Up to the Law: The Calculating Rugged Individual
and the Battle of Wits
For Justice Jackson, when a rugged individual like Ashcraft confessed,
the explanation lay in the likelihood that he had calculated that he could win
a “battle of wits” with the police, only to discover that he was mistaken:
The strategy of the officers evidently was to keep him talking, to give
him plenty of rope and see if he would not hang himself. He does not
claim to have made objection to this. Instead he relied on his wits.
The time came when it dawned on him that his own story brought
him under suspicion, and that he could not meet it. Must the officers
stop at this point because he was coming to appreciate the uselessness
of deception? . . . He had run out of expedients and inventions; he
knew he had lost the battle of wits. After all honesty seemed to be the

154. Id. In far-sighted fashion, Jackson foresaw that Ashcraft was likely to beget a ruling like
Miranda: “But does the Constitution prohibit use of all confessions made after arrest because
questioning, while one is deprived of freedom, is ‘inherently coercive’? The Court does not quite say so,
but it is moving far and fast in that direction.” Id.
155. Id. at 170.
156. Id. at 161 (emphasis added). Jackson did observe that, “[t]he term ‘voluntary’ confession
does not mean voluntary in the sense of a confession to a priest merely to rid one’s soul of a sense of
guilt.” Id.
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best, even if the last, policy. He confessed in detail.157
In Jackson’s view, then, Ashcraft had elected to make the choice often made
by characters in literature and film, like a Moriarity or a Raskolnikov, to
enter into a “battle of wits.” But a suspect who chooses to play a cat-andmouse game with the police does so at his own peril, and if he ends up on
the losing end to a would-be Sherlock Holmes or Porfiry Petrovich, well,
then, he should bear the consequences of his decision.
This Jacksonian perspective on voluntariness—that the rugged
individual should generally be viewed as capable of making the
“calculation” of whether to engage with the police—has since been voiced
a number of times by other Justices and has gradually reshaped Miranda.
Indeed, in Miranda itself, part of the four dissenters’ objection was that, “it
has never been suggested, until today, that such questioning was coercive
and accused persons so lacking in hardihood that the very first response to
the very first question following the commencement of custody must be
conclusively presumed to be the product of an overborne will.” 158 And,
Justice Harlan complained, Miranda essentially eliminated the “battle of
wits” all together:
[T]he thrust of the new rules is to negate all pressures, to reinforce
the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage any
confession at all. The aim in short is toward ‘voluntariness’ in a
utopian sense, . . . voluntariness with a vengeance.159
I think it must be frankly recognized . . . that police questioning .
. . may inherently entail some pressure on the suspect and may seek
advantage in his ignorance or weaknesses. The atmosphere and
questioning techniques, proper and fair though they may be, can in
themselves exert a tug on the suspect to confess . . . .160
[I]nterrogation is no doubt often inconvenient and unpleasant for
the suspect . . . [but] peaceful interrogation is not one of the dark
moments of the law.161
Hence, Harlan had no trouble finding that a “seasoned criminal [who] was
practically given the Court’s full complement of warnings and did not heed
them” should bear full responsibility for confessing.162
157. Id. at 169.
158. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 535 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 515.
161. Id. at 517.
162. Id. at 518 n.15 (describing the Westover case, one of the cases that was consolidated). Harlan
likewise dismissed Ernesto Miranda’s confession as the product of “brief, daytime questioning” with
“no perceptible unfairness, and certainly little risk of injustice.” Id. at 519.
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While the battle of the wits view of police interrogation did not carry the
day in Ashcraft or Miranda, over time it has emerged as an important
paradigm. Indeed, the paradigm is a useful way to conceptualize the Court’s
change in approach and tenor to Miranda issues. The Miranda opinion
viewed any person, even the rugged individual, as not only unlikely to win
the battle of wits, but as unlikely to be aware of just how strongly the odds
are stacked in favor of the interrogators. And because Miranda viewed the
decision to engage in the contest as a decision that even the rugged
individual could easily feel pressured to make or get tricked into making,
the decision sounds a strong tone of protecting the person against himself.163
Not only must an individual be warned that he is being asked to enter a
contest in which he does not have to participate (“You have the right . . . ”)
and which may be very unwise (“anything you say . . . ”), but because the
opinion uses a prism of strong skepticism in scrutinizing a citizen’s decision
to match wits, it places the “heavy burden” on the interrogators themselves
to prove that the individual entered the contest with eyes wide open and that
he understood that he could terminate the contest at any point by
“indicat[ing] [that desire] in any manner.”164
Over time, though, the Court began to expressly move back towards a
far more laissez-faire approach that considers the rugged individual as
presumptively capable of deciding for himself whether to play the odds.165
The Court’s later waiver cases, for instance, essentially approach the four
Miranda warnings as a basic explanation of the ground rules if one wants
to enter the battle of wits, and beyond that, the individual is free to make his
calculations—or miscalculations—as he chooses. The police, therefore,
need not provide any information beyond the four warnings even where the
information may have changed his mind about waiving his rights. As the
majority reasoned in holding that a defendant need not be told that he would
be questioned about a different crime than the one for which he was arrested:
We have held that a valid waiver does not require that an individual
be informed of all information “useful” . . . that “might . . . affec[t]
his decision to confess.” . . . [T]he additional information could affect
only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary

163. The Court thus adopted an approach of providing a strong warning rather than prohibiting
the behavior altogether; this approach is similar to how the government approaches other risky behavior.
See, e.g., Day Trading: Your Dollars at Risk, SEC (Apr. 20, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/d
aytips.htm [https://perma.cc/X568-US33].
164. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473, 475.
165. See generally DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HOW DEMOCRACY
AND LAISSEZ FAIRE UNDERMINE THE RULE OF LAW (2016).
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and knowing nature.166
Once the rugged individual has received the warnings, therefore, he is
now like any blackjack player, day trader, or bungee jumper who can assess
the risks and make his own personal decision. Under this caveat emptor
model, the decision to enter the “game” may be unwise because the odds
strongly favor the “house,” but he cannot later complain since he knew the
game when he sat down and put his chips on the table.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the reemergence of the hardy
rugged individual is that the Court increasingly has placed the onus on the
individual to assert his Fifth Amendment rights when dealing with the
police.167 This movement can be starkly seen in the Court’s requirement in
Davis v. United States168 that an individual has to “unambiguously” invoke
the right to counsel, even though the majority “recognize[d] that requiring
a clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects
who—because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of
other reasons—will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they
actually want to have a lawyer present.”169
It was in Berghuis v. Thompkins, 170 however, that the Court most
expressly welcomed the hardy rugged individual back home in the police
interrogation context. Through almost three hours of interrogation, Chester
Thompkins had remained silent other than declining a peppermint and
complaining that the chair he was “sitting in was hard,” when out of the blue
one of the officers asked, “Do you believe in God?” 171 This question
triggered a brief exchange during which the officer asked, “Do you pray to
God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?”172 Thompkins answered
“Yes.”173 Yet, despite Miranda’s admonishments that silence could not be
construed as waiver and that the interrogators bore “a heavy burden” to
166. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1987) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
422 (1986)). The Court has likewise held that a defendant need not be informed that an attorney had
been hired on his behalf and was trying to reach him, Moran, 475 U.S. at 422; that a prior statement
obtained unconstitutionally might not be able to be used against him, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
314–318 (1985); and that an incriminating statement can be used even if not written, Connecticut v.
Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 527–30 (1987).
167. The Court has also placed the onus on the citizen to assert her Fifth Amendment rights in
contexts outside of Miranda. In Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178 (2013), the Court in a 5-4 decision held
that to avail herself of the right to silence in a non-custodial “interview” (a situation to which Miranda
would not apply), an individual must affirmatively assert the privilege and cannot simply remain silent.
Id. at 186–90 (allowing prosecutor to argue defendant’s silence in response to a question during the
“interview” as evidence of guilt).
168. 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
169. Id. at 460.
170. 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
171. Id. at 376.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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prove waiver, 174 Justice Kennedy found a valid waiver since he saw in
Thompkins a calculating rugged individual fully in control.175
In a remarkable recasting of how interrogation works, Kennedy
portrayed interrogation not as the Miranda Court had—as an event to be
highly wary of because of the danger of finding one’s self unwittingly
outmatched by sophisticated interrogation techniques—but as an
opportunity for the accused to make a better decision, an almost
empowering experience:
Interrogation provides the suspect with additional information that
can put his or her decision to waive, or not to invoke, into perspective.
As questioning commences and then continues, the suspect has the
opportunity to consider the choices he or she faces and to make a
more informed decision, either to insist on silence or to cooperate.
When the suspect knows that Miranda rights can be invoked any
time, he or she has the opportunity to reassess his or her immediate
and long-term interests. Cooperation with the police may result in
more favorable treatment for the suspect; the apprehension of
accomplices; the prevention of continuing injury and fear; beginning
steps towards relief or solace for the victims; and the beginning of the
suspect’s own return to the law and the social order it seeks to
protect.176
The five-Justice majority thus saw interrogation as an informationgathering session providing the individual “the opportunity to reassess his
or her immediate and long-term interests.” 177 Consequently, and with
reasoning strongly echoing Justice Jackson’s dissenting view of E.E.
Ashcraft, the Court concluded that if Thompkins had ended up making an
incriminating statement that he now regretted, he had no one to blame but
himself:
Thompkins did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did
not want to talk with the police. Had he made either of these simple,
unambiguous statements, he would have invoked his “‘right to cut off
questioning.’” . . . [H]e did neither, so he did not invoke his right to

174. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (declaring state has “heavy burden”); but
see Thompkins 560 U.S. at 383–84, 396–97 (discussing how the “heavy burden” language has been
interpreted since Miranda).
175. Kennedy acknowledged that “some language in Miranda could be read to indicate that”
Thompkins’ behavior could not be seen as a waiver. Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 383. But he saw “[t]he
course of decisions since Miranda” as having diluted Miranda’s strong language about waiver. Id.
176. Id. at 388.
177. Id.
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remain silent.178
Indeed, after Thompkins the only situation where the original susceptible
individual paradigm remains dominant is when the suspect has
unequivocally requested a lawyer. The Court has treated this situation as
one where the suspect has declared that he does not feel able to deal with
the police on his own, and thus must be left alone unless he changes his
mind.179 Even this situation, however, has been critiqued as underestimating
the rugged individual, with Justice Scalia suggesting that these holdings
serve as de facto affirmative action for the “dull-witted” and constitutionally
challenged:
[These] holdings are explicable, in my view, only as an effort to
protect suspects against what is regarded as their own folly. The
sharp-witted criminal would know better than to confess; why should
the dull-witted suffer for his lack of mental endowment? Providing
him an attorney at every stage where he might be induced or
persuaded (though not coerced) to incriminate himself will even the
odds. Apart from the fact that this protective enterprise is beyond our
authority under the . . . Constitution, it is unwise. The procedural
protections of the Constitution protect the guilty as well as the
innocent, but it is not their objective to set the guilty free. That some
clever criminals may employ those protections to their advantage is
poor reason to allow criminals who have not done so to escape
justice.
Thus even if I were to concede that an honest confession is a
foolish mistake, I would welcome rather than reject it; a rule that
foolish mistakes do not count would leave most offenders not only
unconvicted but undetected.180
And while the Court has not gone as far as Justice Scalia would have
liked in curtailing protections even after a citizen has requested a lawyer,
Scalia was able to carry a majority in Maryland v. Shatzer181 for the view
that the susceptible individual who has requested a lawyer regains his
178. Id. at 382. See generally George M. Dery III, Do You Believe in Miranda? The Supreme
Court Reveals its Doubt in Berghuis v. Thompkins by Paradoxically Ruling that Suspects Can Only
Invoke Their Right to Remain Silent by Speaking, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 407 (2011).
179. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–87 (1981). If one were inclined towards maritime
metaphors, one can understand the Court’s distinction between whether a suspect invokes his right to
silence or to an attorney this way: It has treated a suspect’s invocation of the right to remain silent as a
declaration that he is the captain of his own ship and capable of making further decisions, while asking
for a lawyer is sending out an S.O.S. and expressing the sentiment that he is not capable of dealing with
the police by himself.
180. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166–67 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. 559 U.S. 98 (2010).
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rugged individual status two weeks after exiting the custodial interrogation
setting.182 Without the slightest pretense of an empirical basis, the Shatzer
majority speculated that after a fortnight a suspect will have been able to
“shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody,”183 “regain the
degree of control they had over their lives prior to the interrogation,”184 so
that any “change of heart is less likely attributable to [police] ‘badgering’
than . . . to the fact that further deliberation in familiar surroundings has
caused him to believe (rightly or wrongly) that cooperating with the
investigation is in his interest.”185
B. Giving One’s Self Up to the Law: The Interrogation Room As
Confessional
Part of what we have seen in the half-century since Miranda, then, is the
Court moving rather dramatically away from a view of presuming that all
individuals, even rugged ones, are likely to be overwhelmed by the
interrogation context, to the position that once a citizen has received the
Miranda warnings, he or she should be treated as fully capable of deciding
whether to enter a battle of wits with the police. The battle-of-wits rationale,
however, tells only part of the story when it comes to the rugged individual
in a post-Miranda world. It turns out that the rugged individual not only is
a capable, rational actor despite the pressures of the interrogation room, he
also has a conscience that often leads him to want to purge his “guilty
secrets.”186
Justice White, for instance, argued in his Miranda dissent that a
confession may be good for the confessor as well as for society, making it
a win-win for everyone:
And what about the accused who has confessed or would confess in
response to simple, noncoercive questioning and whose guilt could
not otherwise be proved? Is it so clear that release is the best thing
for him in every case? Has it so unquestionably been resolved that in
each and every case it would be better for him not to confess and to
return to his environment with no attempt whatsoever to help him? I
think not. It may well be that in many cases it will be no less than a
callous disregard for his own welfare as well as for the interests of

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 111.
Id. at 110.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 108.
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985).
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his next victim.187
It was Justice Scalia, however, who most strongly voiced the redemptive
view of confessions:
More fundamentally, however, it is wrong, and subtly corrosive of
our criminal justice system to regard an honest confession as a
“mistake.” While every person is entitled to stand silent, it is more
virtuous for the wrongdoer to admit his offense and accept the
punishment he deserves. Not only for society, but for the wrongdoer
himself . . . . A confession is rightly regarded by the Sentencing
Guidelines as warranting a reduction of sentence because it
“demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal
responsibility . . . for criminal conduct,” which is the beginning of
reform. We should, then, rejoice at an honest confession, rather than
the pity the “poor fool” who has made it; and we should regret the
attempted retraction of that good act, rather than seek to facilitate and
encourage it. To design our laws on premises contrary to these is to
abandon belief in either personal responsibility or the moral claim of
just government to obedience.188
The invocation of the penitent suspect is helpful to the Court in justifying
its confession jurisprudence for two reasons. First, the image aids the Court
in reconciling the rugged individual’s ability to resist pressure with his
decision to confess. Now when explaining why the rugged individual “gives
himself up to the law”189 and confesses, the desire to “make a clean breast
of the guilt” 190 helps provide a constitutionally palatable explanation. A
change in heart after invoking one’s right to an attorney, for instance, can
be cast not as the result of giving into interrogation pressures, but, as Chief
Justice Burger argued, “[because] the human urge to confess wrongdoing
is, of course, normal in all save hardened, professional criminals, as
psychiatrists and analysts have demonstrated.”191

187. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 543 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White similarly
noted in another part of the opinion that, “it is by no means certain that the process of confessing is
injurious to the accused. To the contrary it may provide psychological relief and enhance the prospects
for rehabilitation.” Id. at 538. Chief Justice Rehnquist also expressed the belief that “completely
voluntary confessions may, in many cases, advance the cause of justice and rehabilitation.” Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 n.23 (1974).
188. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
(quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1988)).
189. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 161 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
190. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 604 (1944).
191. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing T. Reik, THE
COMPULSION TO CONFESS (1972)).
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And in Oregon v. Elstad,192 the Court used the idea of the “guilty secret”
as a way to downplay the effect that a prior un-Mirandized statement would
have on a suspect in making a later confession:
There is a vast difference between the direct consequences flowing
from coercion of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate
means calculated to break the suspect’s will and the uncertain
consequences of disclosure of a ‘guilty secret’ freely given in
response to an unwarned but noncoercive question . . . . 193
Therefore, the Elstad majority reasoned, because it is “difficult to tell with
certainty what motivates a suspect to speak”—it may involve a “visit with
a minister” or “[an] exchange of words . . . with his father”—Miranda
warnings before the second statement “ordinarily” would be sufficient to
allow the rugged individual to regain perspective and make “a rational and
intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights” in deciding to
repeat the guilty secret.194
It was in Thompkins, however, that the notion of a “guilty secret” gained
full status with its implication that the rugged individual might voluntarily
choose to get a wrongdoing off his chest. Recall that Justice Kennedy
characterized the decision to waive one’s Miranda rights as an ongoing
collection by the suspect of “additional information” to allow “a more
informed decision.” 195 And while he included the type of “additional
information” that one might first suppose, such as the hope that
“[c]ooperation with the police may result in more favorable treatment,”196
Kennedy also expressly included the weighing of how a confession might
be the “beginning steps towards relief or solace for the victims[] and the
beginning of the suspect’s own return to the law and the social order it seeks
to protect.”197 After Thompkins, the desire for repentance and atonement
(what the Elstad dissenters sarcastically dubbed the “guilty secrets
doctrine”) 198 appears to now fully be part of the rugged individual’s
persona.199

192. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
193. Id. at 312.
194. Id. at 314 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 220 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
195. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388 (2010); see supra notes 170–174 and
accompanying text.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 372 n.25. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the dissent described the majority’s
reasoning as “marble-palace psychoanalysis”).
199. This is comparable to how the Court rationalizes why the rugged individual would want to
cooperate in the Fourth Amendment context. See Sundby, supra note 42, at 719–20.
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In addition to providing a rationale for why the rugged individual might
confess, the suspect as penitent offers an additional advantage to the Justices
desiring to curtail Miranda’s reach. In deciding cases on whether Miranda
should have exceptions such as a public safety exception,200 the Court has
expressly invoked a cost-benefit analysis. Typically, this involves the Court
weighing perceived lost convictions as the primary “cost” of giving the
Miranda warnings against the “benefit” of fewer involuntary confessions
on the other side of the ledger.201 The heralding of confessions as the first
virtuous step towards rehabilitation, therefore, can also help tilt the calculus
in favor of allowing police practices that encourage confessions: the “cost”
of using Miranda is not only fewer convictions, but for those Justices who
view confessions as a crucial step towards absolution, fewer redeemed
criminals.
V. JUDGING THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE RUGGED AND SUSCEPTIBLE
INDIVIDUAL
By tracking the evolving struggle within the Court between whether to
use the rugged or susceptible individual as the measure of what happens
when human nature is tested in the interrogation room, we now have a way
of thinking and talking about the cases that allows a deeper analysis. From
Justice Black’s depiction of E.E. Ashcraft as the everyday individual likely
to be overwhelmed by the pressures of incommunicado interrogation and
the tricks of the interrogator’s trade 202 (a depiction later given full
constitutional voice in Chief Justice Warren’s Miranda opinion), the Court
has largely returned to viewing the suspect as the hardy person fully capable
of rationally calculating for himself whether to enter a battle of wits or to
go down the path of repentance.
Yet this return to the rugged individual archetype was done without
overruling Miranda and with the specters of cases like Bram, Ashcraft, and
Spano still very much present in the case law. As a result, two distinct views
of the human psyche reside side-by-side within the Court’s approach to
voluntariness; a result that, unsurprisingly, leaves the law in the area with a
distinctly schizophrenic cast that is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. Our
next task, therefore, is to begin to diagnose the strengths and weaknesses of
each viewpoint as a means of plumbing the underlying values and principles
at work depending on which archetype is used.

200.
201.
202.

See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
Id. at 657.
See supra notes 106–111 and accompanying text.
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A. Critiquing the “Battle of Wits”
Part of the appeal of the “battle of wits” scenario is that it invokes an
image that is comfortingly in accord with images we cherish of the
American legal system. Though the end goal is confession to a crime, the
scenario enshrines the suspect as a citizen fully in control of his or her fate.
And by treating the citizen-suspect as master of his fate and a worthy
opponent of law enforcement, the law bestows a constitutional dignity on
the suspect. To read some of the Justices’ descriptions of the interrogation
process, the ultimate decision to confess for many suspects is the equivalent
of the chess player scanning the board after a hard fought game and tipping
over one’s king in begrudging but respectful resignation.
The difficulty with this scenario is that the typical interrogation is
anything but a James Moriarty calmly matching wits with a Sherlock
Holmes. Rather the suspect is much more likely to be a person who finds
himself in crisis mode trying to make decisions without a clear sense of what
the police know or are obligated to do. The burgeoning research studying
decision-making under stress has found that decisions made under
conditions of high anxiety produces both biological and psychological
conditions that can greatly impede one’s judgment and comprehension.203
Unsurprisingly, the effects of stress carry over to the Miranda context,
affecting both the ability to understand the warnings and to make rational
judgments. 204 In short, the susceptible individual that Justices Black and
Warren saw in everyday citizens when subjected to typical interrogation
techniques, even techniques far short of “enhanced interrogation,” now has
a solid empirical footing.
203.

See generally ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST
(2017) (using neurobiology to explain decision making under stress).
204. See, e.g., Richard Rogers et al., Decrements in Miranda Abilities: An Investigation of
Situational Effects Via a Mock-Crime Paradigm, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 392 (2011) (finding, in mock
study of college students, impairment in both memory of Miranda warnings and subsequent reasoning
when placed under stress); Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False
Confessions: Compliance, Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 125–128 (1996)
(finding ability to induce false confessions in college students in mock setting); Melissa B. Russano et
al., Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI.
481, 481–486 (2005); Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights:
The Power of Innocence, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 211–221 (2004) (finding ability to induce false
confessions in college students in mock setting).
Most of the studies on how stress affects Miranda comprehension and decision making have been
done in mock settings using college students, a group that on average will be more educated and know
they are participating in an experiment. The findings are all the more alarming, then, when extrapolated
to the real-life setting of a police station interrogation room involving a suspect who is unlikely to be as
well-educated. One study looking at pretrial detainees found the calculating criminal model to not reflect
the realities of how someone in custody reacts. Because of temporal discounting, many offenders are
more concerned about their immediate circumstances than the long-term consequences. See Hayley L.
Blackwood et al., Investigating Miranda Waiver Decisions: An Examination of the Rational
Consequences, 42 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 11 (2015).
AND WORST
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A suspect’s susceptibility is amplified by the fact that the police are not
bound by any rules of honesty or forthrightness so long as they do not
actively mislead the individual as to his or her right to end the interrogation
or have a lawyer present.205 The interrogator’s techniques that Chief Justice
Warren detailed in Miranda that are designed to heighten pressures on the
individual who is “swept from familiar surroundings into police custody,
surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of
persuasion,” 206 continue to be taught and practiced widely. 207 As Judge
Posner has observed, “[t]he policeman is not a fiduciary of the suspect. The
police are allowed to play on a suspect’s ignorance, his anxieties, his fears,
and his uncertainties.”208 And while a suspect is told under Miranda that
“anything you say can be used against you,” that lone warning does not in
any way reveal that the police will be allowed to “pressure and cajole,
conceal material facts and actively mislead,”209 an omission in the warnings
that is especially important where a key interrogation strategy is often to
lure the individual into believing that the police simply want to hear his side
of the story.210
A more accurate warning would tell a suspect, “We are here to try and
obtain a confession of guilt from you. We are trained in techniques that are
designed to have you make a confession and, in so doing, we may tell you
things that are untrue, we may affirmatively mislead you as to what we
know, we may even commit fraud.”211 Such a fifth warning will never, of
course, find its way onto the Miranda warning card. Interrogators would
blanch at the prospect of forewarning a suspect that they might lie and
mislead because such a warning would defang their techniques and likely
lead to a greater rate of refusal to be interrogated.

205. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432–433 (1986). For a thoughtful look at the use of
trickery and deception that concludes that deception should be allowed in limited circumstances, see
Christopher Slobogin, The Legality of Trickery During Interrogation, 43 INTERROGATION, CONFESSION
& TRUTH: COMP. STUD. IN CRIM. PROC. 61, 61–86 (2020).
206. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966).
207. See Douglas Starr, The Interview: Do Police Interrogation Techniques Produce False
Confessions?, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/12/09/th
e-interview-7 [https://perma.cc/BW2V-YFJE]; see also Tracy Hresko Pearl, Fifty Years Later: Miranda
& the Police, 50 TEX. TECH L. REV. 63, 71 (2017) (finding that police tactics have not changed postMiranda); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1530 (2008)
(describing how police interrogation techniques from the Miranda decision, like the Reid Technique,
are still taught to officers).
208. United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1130 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (noting that the
police “are not allowed to magnify those fears, uncertainties, and so forth to the point where rational
decisions become impossible”).
209. Id. at 1131.
210. Starr, supra note 207.
211. Cf. Rutledge, 900 F.2d. at 1130–31 (noting that even if officers had promised a benefit “from
spilling the beans,” “it was the sort of minor fraud that the cases allow”).
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Nor is it realistic to propose that the law conceptualize the interrogator
as the suspect’s fiduciary and act in a way that accounts for the suspect’s
best interests; the interrogator and suspect inescapably are adversaries, and
it is best that the law fully acknowledges that relationship. 212 The point,
rather, is that the Court should not be allowed to justify its voluntariness
doctrine by utilizing an image of interrogations as a constitutionally
edifying experience for the citizen-suspect when few citizens are
psychologically equipped to confront a hostile high-pressure atmosphere
unaware that the police are allowed to lie and mislead.
Moreover, the asymmetry of power will place some suspects in a far
more disadvantageous position under the Fifth Amendment privilege than
others. The politician or businessperson under criminal investigation almost
certainly will have a lawyer either already involved by the time that
questioning occurs or have ready access to a lawyer who can intervene.213
Similarly, an affluent individual likely will have business or personal
attorneys who can quickly find a criminal defense attorney if questioning is
imminent. More fundamentally, a person who has employed attorneys
before will feel in a far better position to demand their right to an attorney
because lawyers will have been a familiar part of their professional and
personal lives.214
This skewing of the ability to exercise one’s Fifth Amendment rights
toward the wealthy and educated is exacerbated by additional factors that
receive far too little attention. Particularly problematic, given the Court’s
insistence that the suspect must act the rugged individual and assert his
rights directly and authoritatively, is that someone who feels relatively
212. The need to craft the doctrine governing interrogations with a forthright acknowledgment of
the adversarial relationship is one reason why the “penitent” rationale is both flawed and dangerous. See
infra Part IV.B.
213. See Hartmut Berghoff & Uwe Spiekermann, Shady Business: On the History of White-Collar
Crime, 60 BUS. HIST. 289, 290 (2018) (noting the historically “privileged position of white-collar
criminals” such as the ability to “afford the best lawyers”).
214. As one judge recently objected in being forced to use a purely objective standard in
determining whether a defendant would have felt he was in custody for Miranda’s purposes:
Would it not be more consistent with the values that the Fifth Amendment has traditionally
been understood to protect . . . to require the trial court to make fact-specific findings as to what
a motorist in the given circumstances would reasonably have expected from his encounter with
police? Shouldn't a trial court at least consider the need to distinguish, for purposes of assessing
the reasonable feelings and expectations of the wayfarer, between the white businessman
stopped in his Mercedes as he drives along [upscale] Brickell Avenue at lunchtime, and the
teenager of color [like the defendant] stopped on his bicycle as he pedals through a low-income
neighborhood at dusk?
State v. Santiago, No. F16-18479, 2017 WL 449266 at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 24, 2017) (Hirsch, J.)
(emphasis original) (order denying defendant’s motion to suppress); see also David Rossman,
Resurrecting Miranda’s Right to Counsel, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1129, 1133 (2017) (“In my forty-five years
as a criminal trial attorney, the ones who do not [waive their Miranda rights] are overwhelming[ly] either
professional criminals or educated people with money. Neither group is likely to be as intimidated by
the police as those who make up the rest.”).
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powerless is likely to “use less direct and assertive patterns of speech.”215
Since many minority citizens when confronted by the police are going to be
acutely aware of the power differential, the effect is to often place minorities
in a distinctly disadvantaged position when trying to exercise their rights.216
As a result, “members of racial and ethnic minority groups who fear the way
the police interact with their community” are going to be far less likely to
exercise their rights.217
The unevenness of the psychological playing field is often further tilted
against the citizen by how the Miranda warnings are stated and conveyed.
First, a staggering number of variations of the Miranda warnings are given
nationwide and they vary widely from a third-grade reading level up
through post-college,218 often using words such as “indigent” or legal-laden
language like “admissible” that are not within the vocabulary of many.219
Moreover, most individuals are not particularly competent at
comprehending
orally
communicated
information—a
college
undergraduate is likely to recall less than fifty percent of a typical Miranda
warning consisting of 125 to 175 words220—and that low comprehension is
without the police “speed reading” the warnings at over 200 words a
215. Janet Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police
Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 320 (1993); see generally Marcy Strauss, Understanding Davis v.
United States, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1011 (2007). A case that garnered a fair amount of media attention
involved a suspect who at one point said, “if y’all think I did it, I know that I didn’t do it, so why don’t
you just give me a lawyer dog cause this is not what’s up.” See, e.g., Tom Jackman, The Suspect Told
Police “Give Me a Lawyer Dog.” The Court Says He Wasn’t Asking for a Lawyer, WASH. POST, Nov.
2, 2017. The Louisiana Supreme Court refused to find that this was an unambiguous request for a lawyer,
and, therefore, found no constitutional violation. State v. Demesme, 228 So. 3d. 1206 (La. 2017) (mem.)
(Chricton, J., concurring). Although the media was drawn to the story because of the suspect’s use of
the phrase “lawyer dog,” a deeper issue resides in the case: not only must someone affirmatively assert
their rights, they must do so in the language of the police and courts. The other option, of course, was to
adopt the four Justices’ position in Davis that the police if unsure whether a suspect is requesting a
lawyer “should stop their interrogation and ask him to make his choice clear.” Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 467 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
216. See C. Antoinette Clark, Say It Loud: Indirect Speech and Racial Equality in the
Interrogation Room, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 813, 820–26 (1999) (exploring how minorities
are disadvantaged by the requirement that rights must be asserted unequivocally); see also Floralynn
Einesman, Confessions and Culture: The Interaction of Miranda and Diversity, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 12 (1999) (detailing how objective standards for issues like custody “maintain the
power” of the majority and disenfranchises the minority).
217. Rossman, supra note 214, at 1133; see generally Sundby, supra note 42, at 723–26
(discussing studies of how interactions between police and members of a minority community are
especially fraught with potential conflict).
218. RICHARD ROGERS & ERIC DROGIN, MIRANDIZED STATEMENTS: SUCCESSFULLY
NAVIGATING THE LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES 215 (2014) (identifying more than 1,000 unique
variations, varying in length by more than 500 words, with reading levels that range from grade three to
post-college).
219. See generally Richard Rogers et al., General Knowledge and Misknowledge of Miranda
Rights: Are Effective Miranda Advisements Still Necessary? 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 432 (2013).
220. Richard Rogers & Eric Y. Drogin, Miranda Rights and Wrongs: Matters of Justice, 51 CT.
REV. 150, 152 (2015).
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minute 221 or reciting them in a “mechanical, bureaucratic” fashion that
serves to “trivialize their potential significance and minimize their
effectiveness.”222 Nor is it an easy rebuttal that everyone already knows the
Miranda warnings from popular-culture mediums like television and the
movies; in fact, studies have shown that many do not understand the nature
of the rights, especially when it comes to the critical knowledge that a
lawyer will be appointed without personal expense and that the individual
has the right to end the interrogation at any time.223
In sum, to the extent there are suspects who could live up to the Court’s
ideal of the calculating rugged individual, it will almost certainly be a
person of high social status and socioeconomic standing. And perhaps there
is more than a touch of irony that it precisely such an individual who would
almost always decline to engage the police in a battle of wits and call a
lawyer instead.
B. Critiquing the Interrogation Room as Confessional
The justification for encouraging confessions as a step on the path
towards repentance is of course far more difficult to empirically test. This
is true both for Chief Justice Burger’s general psychological proposition that
“[t]he human urge to confess wrongdoing is . . . normal in all save hardened,
professional criminals”224 and for the idea that a confession to interrogators
should be embraced as part of a suspect’s journey towards absolution.
Even if these propositions are believed to be true, however, their use as
a justification for relaxed constitutional scrutiny of interrogation is
troubling. The most fundamental objection is the incongruity and, quite
frankly, oddness of trying to equate the atmosphere and effects of a
confession in a religious or personal context to that of a police station.
Perhaps if a confession to the police in fact triggered a different response
221. A fascinating empirical analysis of audiotaped warnings given by Canadian police to suspects
found that almost two-thirds of the right to silence warnings (65%) and almost one-third (32%) of the
right to a lawyer warnings exceeded 200 words per minute, the upper range for understanding speech.
The average speech rate for the right to silence warning alone was a blazing 264 words per minute, while
the right to legal counsel warning clocked in at 202 words per minute on average. Brent Snook, Joseph
Eastwood & Sarah MacDonald, A Descriptive Analysis of How Canadian Police Officers Administer the
Right-to-Silence and Right-to-Legal Counsel Cautions, 52 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 545,
553-56 (2010).
222. Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1003 n.15 (2001).
223. Rogers & Drogin, supra note 220 at 151 (a survey of a jury pool that represented a crosssection of the community about common knowledge of Miranda rights found that, “[w]hile performing
moderately well on the first component, right to silence, they faltered on the other three basic
components, averaging only 45% correct: risks of talking, right to counsel, and free legal services. The
fifth component of most Miranda warnings, addressing the assertion of rights at any time, or continuing
rights, is almost universally missed.”).
224. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420 (1977) (Burger, J., dissenting).
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from the criminal justice system, placing the confessor on a “repentance
track” with counseling and rehabilitative opportunities, one could take such
a rationale more seriously. But in many cases, even in those where a Justice
invokes the rationale, the confession leads to harsh retribution and
sometimes even a walk to the death chamber. At most, a confessing
defendant generally earns a reduction in his sentence through “acceptance
of responsibility” credit, but that reduction in reality is a payoff for saving
the criminal justice system from having to conduct a trial rather than any
acknowledgment of the defendant’s atonement.225 Indeed, while judges may
believe that they can determine remorsefulness, there is scant empirical
evidence to support their ability to divine whether a defendant is remorseful
in a consistent and accurate manner.226
The repentance rationale also is potentially dangerous in the sense of
offering a facile way of simultaneously absolving the police while
explaining why someone would act against their own apparent self-interest.
One court, for instance, used the rationale to find the defendant’s confession
to be voluntary even though it came following improper police conduct:
“[the defendant’s] confession and consent to search . . . were prompted not
by any misconduct of the officers, but by appellant’s own guilty conscience
and desire to be caught, and were thus sufficiently purged of the taint of the
illegal arrest.” 227 This is not only a rather remarkable feat of judicial
psychoanalysis given that the record holds no indication of why the
defendant ultimately confessed, 228 it also vividly demonstrates how the
repentant rugged-individual trope offers an easy way to finesse an otherwise
extremely difficult causal determination: by hypothesizing that a confession
was the product of the defendant’s “guilty conscience and desire to be
caught,” the court is able to absolve the preceding police misbehavior from
tainting the confession and find that the confession was voluntary.

225. See Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American Inquisition: Sentencing After the Federal Guidelines,
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 18 (2010) (discussing how the sentencing guidelines incentivize defendants
to waive trial and plea).
226. See generally Susan A. Bandes, Remorse and Criminal Justice, 8 EMOTION REV. 14 (2015)
(examining lack of empirical evidence that judges or juries can accurately determine remorse);
Rocksheng Zhong, Judging Remorse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 133 (2015) (interviewed
judges revealed a wide discrepancy in perceptions of remorse).
227. United States v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1986).
228. To the court’s credit, it did not entirely accept the government’s argument that the
“‘defendant’s submissive arrest posture may indicate a guilty mind,’” noting it could have also been an
“acquiescence to a show of official authority.” Id. at 1515 (quoting the district court’s decision). Instead,
the court relies on the passage of forty-five minutes since the illegal arrest, the giving of Miranda
warnings in the interim, and that the defendant initiated the statement by saying “Why don’t we just get
this over with.” Id. at 1514. While these factors are relevant under the test in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590 (1975), they do not by themselves show the taint from the illegal arrest had been broken, let alone
that his offer to confess was resulting from a “guilty conscience.”
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The repentant rugged individual, however, not only allows courts to
sanitize police misbehavior in explaining subsequent confessions. By
suggesting that confessions are beneficial for the suspect as well as law
enforcement, it also encourages judges to view all but the most egregious
police pressure not just benignly, but positively. While this rationale applies
across all police interrogation, the cases involving an appeal to a suspect’s
religiosity highlight how police pressure can be given a positive veneer if
confessions are viewed as good for the suspect.
In Welch v. Butler, 229 for instance, Welch, who was suspected of a
murder, agreed to be questioned and denied killing the victim. He ended the
interrogation, however, after being told that the police had taped his
conversations with his estranged wife during which he admitted the killings.
230
With Welch’s ending of the interrogation, Officer Easley, who had not
been a part of the original interrogation, entered the room. Easley, who had
listened to the tapes and had heard Welch make statements to his wife
expressing a concern that God would not forgive him for the murder, then
held what the court labeled a “prayer session:”
Easley, a professed born-again Christian . . . apparently was
concerned that Welch misunderstood the nature of divine
forgiveness. Upon entering the room, he immediately identified
himself as a police officer. Easley and Welch discussed forgiveness
and salvation and prayed together for about three hours. During this
time, Welch made incriminating statements.231
After the “prayer session,” Welch agreed to make another statement, and
the trial court admitted the statements made both during and after the
“prayer session.”232
That Welch first tried to claim the priest-penitent privilege as a way to
exclude the “prayer session” statements gives a sense of how perplexing the
inquiry becomes from a voluntariness standpoint once law enforcement uses
an appeal to a suspect’s religious beliefs to obtain a confession.233 Nor is
one likely to take much comfort from the Fifth Circuit’s expressly felt need
to note that while “religious speculation about the ‘voluntariness’ of
229. 835 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1988).
230. At his murder trial, the court suppressed the tapes of the wife’s conversations with the
defendant based on husband-wife privilege. Id. at 93.
231. Id.
232. The Fifth Circuit noted that Easley when asked by other officers upon leaving the
interrogation room if Welch had confessed, replied “that he had not asked Welch anything like that.” Id.
While he might not have asked any classic interrogation questions during the “prayer session,” Easley
did testify at trial about Welch’s incriminating statements during the session.
233. The Louisiana Court of Appeals rejected the privilege claim since Easley was not a
clergyman within the meaning of the statute. State v. Welch, 448 So.2d 705, 712 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
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yielding to the will of God . . . has its place,” it did not view that question
as relevant to the legal inquiry of voluntariness.234
What is relevant for our purposes, however, is that the court was able to
use the idea that Welch was repenting as a way to conclude that Welch’s
confessions were not the product of police pressure, because “at most, the
police set up a situation . . . in the hope that his desire to be saved would
lead him to confess.” 235 And perhaps most striking was that by casting
Welch’s real motivation for the confession as a concern about personal
salvation, the court was able to absolve Officer Easley of any constitutional
sins and conclude that “[w]hat coercion . . . existed was sacred, not
profane.” 236 Left unexplained is why, if Welch’s confessions were a
“sacred” outcome, he tried to exclude his confessions—beginning with his
state appeals all the way through federal habeas corpus—rather than
embracing them as a first step to repentance.
The repentant rugged individual thus offers the courts an easy way to
cast interrogation and confessions in a positive light. However, without any
empirical basis for believing that confessions to law enforcement actually
promote redemption, it is difficult to take the rationale seriously when the
confession is used to punish rather than to forgive. This is not to deny that
Lady Macbeth-type confessions occur or that self-awareness and
acknowledgment of one’s transgressions promotes spiritual and religious
growth.237 To build a constitutional doctrine on the idea that many criminal
suspects undergoing interrogation are having a road-to-Damascus
revelation inside an interrogation room in the back of a police station,
however, should require considerably more than sheer supposition.
C. False Confessions
Even if, as has been argued above, neither the Court’s calculating nor the
penitent rugged individual withstands empirical or logical scrutiny, the
contention remains that the rugged individual is a necessary fiction to give
police adequate leeway to obtain confessions. This is the core reason that
Justice Jackson repeatedly raised in maintaining the rugged individual
narrative in his efforts to ward off preemptive measures to significantly
234. Welch, 835 F.2d at 95.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Nor is it to deny that admitting to wrongdoing is the more virtuous action or that the refusal
to confess should not be “romanticized.” Albert W. Alschuler, Miranda’s Fourfold Failure, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 849, 865 (2017). Professor Alschuler’s thoughtful defense of the penitence view makes a strong
case against the “glorification of noncooperation.” Id. at 868. The question this Article poses is not what
would be the correct moral choice if a suspect was freely choosing to confess, but the defensibility of
courts’ using penitence as a post hoc rationale with little evidence that defendants who confess are doing
so because they decided to take the moral high road.
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curtail interrogation. And to Jackson’s credit, he acknowledged that the
question of voluntariness was not a mere historical inquiry delving into the
suspect’s mind, but rather a question of how much pressure can be applied
before it goes beyond what society will tolerate in obtaining necessary
confessions.
Justice Jackson in Watts v. Indiana238 presented what he saw as “a real
dilemma in a free society” if a suspect is not advised of his right to counsel
and subjected to interrogation:
To subject one without counsel to questioning . . . is a real peril to
individual freedom. [But t]o bring in a lawyer means a real peril to
solution of the crime because, under our adversary system, he deems
that his sole duty is to protect his client—guilty or innocent—and that
in such a capacity he owes no duty whatever to help society solve its
crime problem. . . .
If the State may arrest on suspicion and interrogate without
counsel, there is no denying the fact that it largely negates the benefits
of the constitutional guaranty of the right to assistance of counsel.
....
. . . But if the ultimate quest in a criminal trial is the truth and if
the circumstances indicate no violence or threats of it, should society
be deprived of the suspect’s help in solving a crime merely because
he was confined and questioned when uncounseled?
....
. . . If it does, the people of this country must discipline themselves
to seeing their police stand by helplessly while those suspected of
murder prowl about unmolested. Is it a necessary price to pay for the
fairness which we know as “due process of law”?239
Justice Jackson’s framing of the issue as involving the specter of the public
having to watch “helplessly while those suspected of murder prowl about
unmolested” suggests that perhaps he did not see the situation as a “real
dilemma” even though he disavowed “know[ing] the ultimate answer to
these questions.”240 Still, even if Jackson may not have had quite as open a
mind as his statement of the dilemma first suggests, he does helpfully frame
the issue as to when a confession should be deemed involuntary from a
238. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
239. Id. at 59–62 (Jackson, J., concurring). Although Jackson concurred in the suppression of the
confession in Watts, his concurrence is combined with dissents in the companion cases and presents a
view of voluntariness at odds with the majority.
240. Id. at 61–62.
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policy perspective: at what point does interrogation endanger constitutional
values to such a degree that it becomes better to risk allowing guilty
individuals to go free rather than permitting law enforcement to engage in
the interrogation.
Framed this way, the voluntariness inquiry has a kinship to the dueprocess requirement that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.241
No one doubts that the burden of persuasion that must be met before a
person can be convicted of a crime must be sufficiently high to act as a
strong safeguard against wrongful convictions, because, as is often stated in
popular parlance, “it is better to let ten guilty persons go free than convict
one innocent person.” 242 Yet, the standard is not “beyond any doubt”
because of the recognition that at some point the risk of convicting an
innocent person may be so minimal that the “cost” of freeing a larger
number of guilty individuals is too steep a tradeoff. 243 This is not even
taking into account that we may vary our calculus, at least intuitively, based
on what the “guilty” person who is going free might have done.244
To acknowledge a similar tradeoff in the interrogation context does not,
of course, begin to answer where the voluntariness fulcrum should properly
be placed in weighing lost convictions against the protection of
constitutional values. As we have seen, Chief Justice Warren in Miranda
used the susceptible individual as his baseline to strike the balance strongly
in favor of insulating a suspect from pressures that could trigger a
confession. 245 Unsurprisingly, the criticism that the balance was too
“costly” in terms of lost convictions for the “benefit” of guarding against
involuntary statements has been a staple of the Miranda critique.246 In an
article that garnered considerable attention, Professor Cassell argued, for
instance, that Miranda causes the loss of roughly 28,000 violent-crime
convictions a year, including almost 900 non-negligent homicides, because
of the loss of confessions from suspects who would have confessed if they

241. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
242. See generally, Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 457 (1989).
243. Id. at 458–60.
244. Sir Stephen expressed reservations over whether it was always better that ten guilty
individuals be set free. He argued that “[e]verything depends on what the guilty men have been doing.”
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 438 (1881).
245. See supra Part III.B.
246. The proposition that the warnings’ benefits were outweighed by its costs was expressly used
by the Court in carving out a ‘public safety’ exception to Miranda. New York v. Quarles 467 U.S. 649
(1984). The Court, however, expressly held that an involuntary confession would still need to be
suppressed. Id. at 655 n.5.
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had not been given the warnings.247 And while the studies assigning such a
large “cost” to Miranda have been strongly disputed on methodology
grounds,248 Cassell’s proposed number of lost convictions certainly raises in
high relief Jackson’s question of how the constitutional bargain should be
struck.
The Jacksonian question—how do we define voluntariness in a way that
balances society’s needs to convict the guilty while protecting a suspect’s
rights—needs to account, however, for several critical developments since
he raised it in the 1940s. 249 The most fundamental development is
recognition that false confessions are far more of a danger than commonly
believed. Jackson was not insensitive to the issue, specifically noting that:
Of course, no confession that has been obtained by any form of
physical violence is reliable and hence no conviction should rest upon
one obtained in that manner. Such treatment . . . may . . . break the
will to stand by the truth. Nor is it questioned that the same result can
sometimes be achieved by threats, promises, or inducements, which
torture the mind but put no scar on the body.250

247. Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV.
387, 440 (1996). Professors Cassell and Fowles later examined the effects of Miranda through the use
of police clearance rates and continue to conclude that Miranda causes a statistically significant drop in
the ability of police to clear both violent and property crimes. Paul Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still
Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on
Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REV. 685 (2017).
248. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 538–47 (1996). While Cassell found that confessions
declined about sixteen percent after Miranda, a decline which in turn led to the loss of convictions
against almost four percent of all suspects who are questioned, Schulhofer challenged the data and
methodology, concluding instead that confessions declined only between 6.7 and 9.1 percent, resulting
in the loss of only a “vanishingly small” number of convictions of less than one percent. See also George
C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: “Embedded” in Our National
Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 244 (2002) (“Though he has garnered considerable attention from
some of the nation's top law reviews, as well as the media, Cassell's quantitative claims have not been
generally accepted in either the legal or the social science community.”). Cassell and Fowle’s use of
clearance rates has also received substantial criticism. See Steven J. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda Is
Unjustified—and Harmful, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347 (1997); Floyd Feeney, Police Clearances:
A Poor Way to Measure the Impact of Miranda on the Police, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (“Although
Professors Cassell and Fowles should be commended for their efforts to raise the Miranda debate from
the rhetorical to the empirical level, their study fails to establish the conclusions that they reach.”).
Part of the difficulty is the lack of reliable nationwide data making such empirical determinations
speculative and largely turning on what variables the researchers choose to emphasize. See George C.
Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical Evidence, 43
UCLA L. REV. 821 (1996); Meghan Ryan, Is Miranda Good News or Bad News for the Police? The
Usefulness of Empirical Evidence, 50 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 81, 86–89 (2017).
249. Although Justice Jackson used the Watts case to raise and address the tradeoff question at
length, he also raised similar concerns in his Ashcraft dissent, see Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,
160–62, 174 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
250. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59–60 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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He cited the ability to corroborate a confession, however, as a critical safety
net,251 giving as examples that the suspects in the cases before the Court had
revealed information that only the criminal could have known.252
Jackson’s perspective is a fair representation of what seemed a
commonsense assumption seventy years ago: That innocent people would
not falsely confess unless subjected to extreme measures and that ‘checks’
on reliability existed that would prevent a conviction based on a false
confession from happening. 253 Consequently, prior to DNA testing’s
revelation that wrongful convictions based on false confessions were in fact
occurring at a far greater rate than had been imagined, 254 the primary
“benefit” of using the susceptible individual model was not one of avoiding
wrongful convictions, but of having a criminal justice system not dependent
on coerced statements even if the statements might be reliable. This benefit
is an important one, 255 but Jackson’s prospect of suspected murderers
“prowl[ing] about unmolested”256 was a rhetorically vivid counterweight to
what can come across as a largely abstract values revolving around notions
like “dignity,” or “inviolability of the human personality,”257 or concerns
about “inquisitions.”258
With the advent of DNA testing in the late 1980s, however, the criminal
justice system was abruptly awakened to the fact that certain staples of a
prosecutor’s case—evidence such as eyewitness identifications or jailhouse
informants—were often unreliable.259 Judge Learned Hand had famously

251. Id. at 60 (“Once a confession is obtained it supplies ways of verifying its trustworthiness.”).
252. Jackson gave as an example that in one of the cases the police had found the murder weapon
where the defendant had said he hid it. Id. But see infra note 280 (detailing the defendant’s exoneration
in one of the cases that Jackson had stated had left him with “no doubt that the admissions of guilt were
genuine and truthful”).
253. Although this may have been the prevailing view, concerns over innocent individuals
confessing even in non-extreme contexts were raised by some Justices even prior to DNA testing’s
revelations. In Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 446–47 (1958), the dissenters stressed that even an
educated defendant (in this case a law student) can be innocent but “sorely in need of legal advice once
he is arrested.”
254. See infra notes 263–70 and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 293–307 and accompanying text.
256. Watts, 338 U.S. at 62 (Jackson, J., concurring).
257. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
258. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,168 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting majority
“characterized [the questioning] as a ‘secret inquisition’ invoking all the horrendous associations of
those words” and objecting that “the use of such characterizations is no substitute for . . . detached and
judicial consideration”).
259. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011) (examining the first 250 DNA exonerations that took place from
1989 through early 2010); see also, How Eyewitness Misidentification Can Send Innocent People to
Prison, INNOCENCE PROJECT (April 15, 2020), https://www.innocenceproject.org/how-eyewitnessmisidentification-can-send-innocent-people-to-prison/; Informing Injustice: The Disturbing Use of
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and confidently written that “[o]ur [criminal] procedure has been always
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal
dream.” 260 DNA testing was criminal procedure’s witching hour that
brought the ghosts out from the shadows and proved them to be real.
Perhaps the most counterintuitive discovery from DNA exonerations
was that in over a quarter of these cases, a demonstrably innocent person
had confessed to a serious crime that they in fact had not committed.261 Nor
could these confessions simply be explained away as attributable to a
suspect’s youth or intellectual disability. If the false confessions had been
limited to such situations, the rugged individual model perhaps could still
control the voluntariness doctrine, because factors such as immaturity, lack
of education, and impaired intellect are classic elements of the mantra that
judges recite when deciding if a confession or waiver of rights was
voluntary.262
DNA has confirmed, however, what Justices Black and Warren had
hypothesized in arguing for a susceptible individual model: While it is true
that juveniles and intellectually disabled suspects are particularly
susceptible to falsely confessing,263 the E.E. Ashcrafts of the world are also
vulnerable. In one study of 125 individuals who gave false confessions, less
than one-third were under eighteen, fewer than one-quarter were
intellectually disabled, and only one in ten suffered from mental illness.264
Even assuming that there was no overlap between the juvenile, intellectually
disabled, and mentally ill individuals who falsely confessed, this would still
mean at least one-third of the confessions were from the “typical” adult that
the Court has so often posited as the rugged individual.

Jailhouse Informants, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.innocenceproject.org/informin
g-injustice/.
The number of DNA exonerations as of July 2020 stands at 367. DNA Exonerations in the United
States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/
(last visited July 30, 2020). When one includes non-DNA based exonerations, the National Registry of
Exonerations has recorded 2556 exonerations from 1989 through 2019. The National Registry of
Exonerations Annual Report, NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 3 (March 1, 2020).
260. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
261. DNA Exonerations, supra note 259; see also Facts and Figures, FALSE CONFESSIONS.ORG,
https://falseconfessions.org/fact-sheet/#:~:text=The%20overall%20total%20is%20258,been%20based
%20upon%20false%20confession [https://perma.cc/7MNH-X2GA]. See generally Craig J. Trocino,
You Can’t Handle the Truth: A Primer on False Confessions, 6 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV.
85 (2016).
262. See supra Part I.
263. See Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Psychological Vulnerabilities During Police Interviews. Why Are
They Important?, 15 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 161, 167 (2010).
264. See Richard A. Leo & Steven A. Drizin, The Three Errors: Pathways to False Confession
and Wrongful Conviction, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 9, 13–21 (Daniel Lassiter & Christian Meissner, eds.,
2010).
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Now that we know that innocent defendants, even those who fit the
Court’s rugged individual archetype, do in fact make false confessions, the
balance must be reassessed to reflect that innocent individuals will be
convicted if the Court is not sufficiently rigorous in policing involuntary
confessions. Indeed, if an individual wanted to engage in a bit of rhetorical
counter-flourish to Justice Jackson, one might instead say that “without
reform, the people of this country must discipline themselves . . . to
stand[ing] by helplessly while individuals innocent of nothing more than
succumbing to police pressures and deception will languish in prison cells
or walk to the death chamber.” 265 This rephrasing of Jackson’s ominous
warning is not meant to dismiss or discount the need for effective crime
detection, but one must be wary of letting nightmare scenarios fully control
the narrative on either side of the balance.
Justice Jackson’s assumption that corroboration will provide a backstop
against unreliable confessions has also proven to be a less than foolproof
safety net. As studies of false confession have discovered, false confessions
often contain facts that could be known only to the perpetrator because the
police during interrogation, sometimes deliberately, sometimes
unknowingly, supply facts that the confessor then incorporates into his
confession as he succumbs to police pressure.266 Professor Garrett found
that as of 2015, an astonishing
ninety-four percent . . . of . . . false confessions by DNA exonerees
were contaminated by . . . “inside” information . . . . Almost without
exception [the confessions included] crime scene details which these
innocent suspects . . . could not have . . . been familiar with until they
learned of them from law enforcement.267
Not surprisingly, the prosecutors in these cases had hammered home in
closing arguments to the jury that the accused’s confession could not be

265. The Netflix documentaries Making a Murderer and When They See Us have likely done more
to trigger a public debate over the reliability of confessions than the legion of law review articles and
books written on the topic of police interrogation. Making a Murderer raises questions about the
confession of Brendan Dassey, who was sixteen at the time and intellectually challenged. Despite
initially winning habeas relief based on a finding that his confession was involuntary, the Seventh Circuit
reversed the lower court and the Supreme Court has declined to hear the case. Daniel Victor, Supreme
Court Won’t Hear Appeal of ‘Making a Murderer’ Subject Brendan Dassey, N.Y. TIMES (June 25,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/us/brendan-dassey-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/
79QX-47DE]. When They See Us deals with the “Central Park Five,” five young Black men convicted
of raping a jogger and later exonerated when the actual rapist came forward to confess and DNA
confirmed he was the perpetrator. The defendants were convicted based on uncounseled confessions that
later turned out to be coerced.
266. Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1066–92
(2010).
267. Brandon L. Garrett, Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REV. 395, 410 (2015).
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false because the statement contained information that only someone who
committed the crime could know.268
And while one may try to take comfort in the idea the false confessions
in these cases were uncovered, especially since many were death penalty
cases, that comfort leads to a distressing corollary: most cases involving
false confessions will not be so “easy.” In many cases a false confession
will likely go undiscovered because it did not contain biological evidence
or did not receive the heightened post-conviction scrutiny that a capital
crime is far more likely to receive. Instead, in those cases a false confession,
often containing facts that could only be known to the perpetrator, will
likely lead to a conviction with little chance of the false confession ever
being uncovered. 269 Therefore, the assumption that Justice Jackson argued
for in calibrating his voluntariness balance—that if a confession includes
“conditions which could only have been known” to the perpetrator it must
be “genuine and truthful”—turns out not to be the safe commonsense
assumption we once thought.270
The other major qualifier to Justice Jackson’s striking of the balance is
one that he also could not have foreseen at the time he wrote. His primary
focus for the voluntariness inquiry was on the confession’s reliability. The
essential question for Jackson was at what point did physical or
psychological coercion become so severe that a confession was no longer
“reliable and hence no conviction should rest upon one obtained in that
manner.” 271 Almost forty years later, however, the Court in Colorado v.
Connelly272 cast doubt on the availability of reliability as a constitutional
safeguard.
Francis Connelly, a chronic paranoid schizophrenic who was hearing the
“voice of God,” approached a police officer and without prompting

268. Id. at 411–15.
269. As Professor Garrett notes, the use of false confessions was especially troubling given that
of the sixty-six exonerees who falsely confessed, exonerating DNA evidence existed in nineteen of the
cases at the time of the conviction. Id. at 407–08. That almost thirty percent of the cases involved the
use of confessions despite the presence of exonerating DNA is powerful evidence of how once a
confession is obtained, the confession takes over the perception and handling of a case. Id. See also Saul
M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 AM. PSYCHOL. 431 (2012).
270. The highlighting of the role of contamination in false confessions does not require that one
cast law enforcement as a villain intent on obtaining confessions despite innocence. Detective James
Trainum has provided an invaluable first-hand description of how he and his fellow detectives
inadvertently contaminated a confession in a murder case that might have resulted in a wrongful
conviction if not for the fortuitous existence of exonerating evidence. Saul Elbein, Confessions Act One:
Kim Possible, THIS AM. LIFE (Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.thisamericanlife.org/507/transcript. See also
JAMES TRAINUM, HOW THE POLICE GENERATE FALSE CONFESSIONS: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE
INTERROGATION ROOM (2016) (exploring how police interrogation techniques can lead to false
confessions).
271. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59–60 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
272. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
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confessed to a murder.273 As part of his Due Process challenge,274 Connelly
argued that the voluntariness doctrine should bar the State’s use of his
confession at trial because it was inherently unreliable based on his
psychosis. Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, rejected reliability as a basis
for exclusion:
Respondent would now have us require sweeping inquiries into the
state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries
quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by
the State. We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry
to be resolved by state laws governing the admission of evidence, and
erects no standard of its own in this area. A statement rendered by
one in the condition of respondent might be proved to be quite
unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws
of the forum and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. “The aim of the requirement of due process is not to
exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.”275
Connelly’s reasoning thus casts doubt on reliability as a reassuring
backstop when it comes to confessions. 276 If part of Justice Jackson’s
justification of using the rugged individual was that we could be confident
that the voluntariness doctrine will account for reliability, Connelly
undermines that underlying premise. Suffering from an acute psychosis,
Francis Connelly was in no position to fulfill the role of the rugged
individual, and yet the Court allowed in a confession that, by the majority’s
own admission, “might be proved to be quite unreliable.” 277 As Justice
Brennan observed in his dissent after noting the lack of any meaningful
corroboration of Connelly’s confession:
Since the Court redefines voluntary confessions to include
273. Id. at 160–61.
274. Before reaching the issue of the confession’s admissibility if it was unreliable, the majority
held that the confession did not come within the Court’s voluntariness doctrine cases because Connelly’s
confession was impelled forward by his psychosis and not by any law enforcement actions. The majority
reasoned, therefore, that because the Due Process clause requires state action to trigger its protections,
even if Connelly’s confession lacked voluntariness in the sense that it was a product of his psychosis
and not his “free will,” the confession was outside the doctrine’s protections. Id. at 165–67. See Primus,
supra note 5, at 31–34.
275. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166–67 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)).
276. See Garrett, supra note 266 at 1109–12 (discussing Connelly and the loss of reliability
review). Professor Primus appropriately cautions against reading Connelly as having dispensed with
reliability as a factor in the involuntariness inquiry altogether, arguing that it still can play a role in a
court’s evaluation if “the police have done something whose effect on the suspect reduces the reliability
of the confession obtained.” Primus, supra note 5, at 34 (emphasis omitted).
277. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.
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confessions by mentally ill individuals, the reliability of these
confessions becomes a central concern. A concern for reliability is
inherent in our criminal justice system, which relies upon
accusatorial, rather than inquisitorial, practices. . . .
....
Minimum standards of due process should require that the trial
court find substantial indicia of reliability, on the basis of evidence
extrinsic to the confession itself, before admitting the confession of a
mentally ill person into evidence. . . . To hold otherwise allows the
State to imprison and possibly to execute a mentally ill defendant
based solely upon an inherently unreliable confession.278
Now that science has punctured our basic assumptions about false
confessions, Connelly’s restrictive notion of the voluntariness doctrine’s
ability to exclude unreliable confessions needs to be reassessed, especially
given that part of the traditional justification for the rugged individual model
is that confessions are generally reliable and verifiable. Justice Jackson’s
rationale for adopting the rugged individual approach to voluntariness no
longer has either the empirical or the doctrinal founding that once appeared
to give it a far sturdier basis when he articulated it in Watts. And it may be
that even prior to DNA testing unveiling the full scope of the problem of
false confessions, Jackson himself eventually would have become more
sympathetic to the idea that the innocent rugged individual could confess to
a crime he did not commit and that the confession might appear reliable
even though it was not; in what constitutes the judicial equivalent of a
dramatic plot twist, in one of the cases where Jackson objected that a reliable
confession was unjustifiably being suppressed,279 the defendant was later
exonerated after another individual admitted to the murder and led
authorities to where he had disposed of the murder weapon.280
278. Id. at 181, 183 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
279. Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 60 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (including Harris’s case as one where “the verification [of
the confession] is sufficient to leave me in no doubt that the admissions of guilt were genuine and
truthful”).
280. The story of L.D. Harris’s case is an inspiring one of lawyers who fought valiantly for their
client despite hostile community sentiment. See Carl Langley, A Tale of Two Men: By 5-4 Vote, the High
Court Unplugged the Electric Chair, AUGUSTA CHRON., July 18, 1979 (on file with author) (explaining
how Harris’s local lawyers “lost a lot of friends” because, as the lawyers explained, “Everybody just
knew Harris was guilty and couldn’t understand our trying to prove his innocence”). Harris was
convicted of killing a shopkeeper and sentenced to death based solely on a confession obtained after
days of intensive incommunicado interrogation conducted in relay fashion by a number of local
authorities inside a cubicle with “stifling heat.” Harris, 338 U.S. at 70. Harris’s lawyers, however, had
become convinced that the police had coached his confession to include facts that only the killer
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D. Beyond False Confessions: Miranda and the Citizen-Government
Relationship
As we have just seen, those Justices not enamored with the susceptible
individual view of interrogation openly lament the potential loss of
confessions and convictions and have used that rationale to limit the scope
of constitutional protections. The choice of a rugged or susceptible
individual model, however, also has doctrinal justifications that need to be
analyzed. One rationale, that a legal standard that encourages confessions
will aid the confessor’s rehabilitation, already has been addressed. 281 A
second rationale, however, has the appeal of casting the rugged individual
standard as actually empowering the individual citizen by giving her more
control over her exercise of rights.
This theme emerged as early as Michigan v. Mosley, 282 a case that
allowed police questioning even after a person had invoked his right to
silence so long as the original invocation was “scrupulously honored.”283 In
rejecting the dissent’s position that renewed questioning should only be
allowed after the suspect has met with an attorney, Justice White saw the
dissent’s position as a “paternalistic rule protecting a defendant from his
intelligent and voluntary decisions about his own criminal case. To do so
would be to ‘imprison a man in his privileges,’ and to disregard ‘that respect
for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’” 284 The Court similarly
used the argument to justify not telling a suspect his family had retained a
lawyer (“Miranda . . . [gave] the defendant the power to exert some control
over the course of the interrogation.”),285 and to justify requiring a suspect
supposedly could have known and, believing in his innocence, pursued his appeals. Id. After winning in
the Supreme Court, and with the prosecution having no evidence other than the suppressed confession,
Harris was released. Id.; see also Pen Releases Negro Freed by High Court, THE STATE, September 24,
1949 (on file with author) (“L.D. Harris, a Negro once convicted of murder . . . has been released and is
now as free as the breeze, according to penitentiary officers.”). But that was not to be the end of the
story. Eleven years after the murder that Harris had been convicted of, a similar brutal attack on a
shopkeeper was committed in the same town and a recently released convict was arrested. That
individual soon revealed that he had committed the murder that Harris had been convicted of, along with
several other murders, and led the police to the crime scenes and to the site where he had buried the
murder weapons; he ultimately plead to four life sentences. Id.; see also Admitted Slayings Probed at
Aiken: Police Search for Weapons After Man Admits Four Murders, THE STATE, August 20, 1957 (on
file with author).
281. See supra Part IV.B.
282. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
283. Id. at 104.
284. Id. at 109 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted). To Justice White’s credit, if he viewed
the defendant as indicating he could not deal with the police on his own by invoking his right to a lawyer,
he precluded further police contact unless the defendant reinitiated the contact. See Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981); supra note 179.
285. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (emphasis in original). The Moran Court also noted
that Miranda had “[d]eclin[ed] to adopt the more extreme position that the actual presence of a lawyer
was necessary to dispel the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation.” Id.
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to actively invoke the right to counsel in the interrogation context even after
counsel has been appointed through the Sixth Amendment (“The dissent
seeks to prevent a defendant altogether from waiving his Sixth Amendment
rights, i.e., ‘to imprison a man in his privileges and call it a Constitution’ . .
. .”).286
An initial temptation may be to view the Court’s invocation of the rugged
individual archetype, especially the idea that one is protecting an individual
from being “imprison[ed]” in his own rights, as little more than a cynical
rationalization to justify broader police powers and more convictions. 287
The sentiment, however, derives from a view put forward by Justice
Frankfurter that deserves to be taken seriously:
When the administration of the criminal law . . . is hedged about as it
is by the Constitutional safeguards for the protection of an accused,
to deny him in the exercise of his free choice the right to dispense
with some of these safeguards . . . is to imprison a man in his
privileges and call it the Constitution. 288
Frankfurter made the argument in a case involving the question of
whether an accused who wanted to represent himself could be forced to
accept a lawyer against his wishes. Indeed, if the idea of a constitutional
right is to enhance personal autonomy, especially in relationship to the
government, Frankfurter’s characterization has an undeniable appeal:
forcing a right upon a citizen can be seen as taking away her dignity and
independence by depriving her of the ability to decide her own course of
action. This viewpoint became a driving force for the Court’s later cases
286. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 788 (2009) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942)). One of the strongest statements of the ‘imprisonment’ view was
Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). Burger saw the majority as
effectively holding that once an individual invoked his right to an attorney under the Sixth Amendment
he could not then waive the invocation until he met with the attorney; that understanding triggered this
response:
[C]onstitutional rights are personal, and an otherwise valid waiver should not be brushed aside
by judges simply because an attorney was not present. The Court’s holding operates to
“imprison a man in his privileges;” it conclusively presumes a suspect is legally incompetent
to change his mind and tell the truth until an attorney is present. It denigrates an individual to
a nonperson whose free will has become hostage to a lawyer so that until the lawyer consents,
the suspect is deprived of any legal right or power to decide for himself that he wishes to make
a disclosure. It denies that the rights to counsel and silence are personal, nondelegable, and
subject to waiver only by that individual.
Id. at 419 (Burger, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted); see id. at 419 n. 2 (arguing
majority’s “paternalistic rule” was “particularly anomalous” given that Faretta had recently “discovered
an independent constitutional right of self-representation.”).
287. Someone of a sarcastic bent might envision a prisoner in a jail cell thinking, “Thank you
Justices ever so much for freeing me from the shackles of the Bill of Rights, even though it means that
I confessed when I otherwise might not have and am now wearing actual shackles; they don’t chafe
nearly as much as those constitutional ones.”
288. Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942).
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enshrining an independent right of self-representation within the Sixth
Amendment;289 as one court succinctly put it in Braveheart fashion, “respect
for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail under his
own banner.”290
As with any guiding principle, however, context is everything. When
Justices recite Frankfurter’s famous quote in the context of interrogation,
they fail to account for a crucial sentence that immediately precedes it: “To
deny an accused a choice of procedure in circumstances in which he, though
a layman, is as capable as any lawyer of making an intelligent choice, is to
impair the worth of great Constitutional safeguards by treating them as
empty verbalisms.”291 In the context of self-representation, this means an
extensive in-court hearing on the accused’s ability to understand the right to
counsel that he is foregoing and requiring a judge to assess whether the
defendant’s decision is knowing and voluntary. 292 The isolation of an
interrogation room is obviously a far different situation, with the citizen’s
ability to make “an intelligent choice” buffeted by the fear and pressure
generated by trained interrogators who are allowed to make up their own
script unbound by the truth.
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter’s admonishment actually argues for a regime
comparable to Miranda, especially with our evolving empirical
understanding of the confession process. If the vitality of constitutional
rights stems in part from the citizen’s free choice to exercise the right, the
Court then has an obligation to ensure that the invocation or declination is
able to be done in a manner that promotes the underlying constitutional
value. Otherwise, the right becomes an “empty verbalism,” not because the
citizen is deprived of autonomy in deciding whether to invoke the right, but
because she is placed in a situation in which she cannot realistically exercise
the right. The susceptible individual model of confessions is targeted
precisely at providing the needed space and information for the citizen to
make the decision whether to invoke the right.
Let us try to take the analysis one step further, though, by using the idea
of autonomy to engage the question of what values are being vindicated by
giving full strength to the privilege against self-incrimination and the idea
of voluntariness. The Justices expressing concern over limiting autonomy
in exercising constitutional rights are not mistaken in worrying that how we
allow rights to be exercised can affect the right itself, even if they are
289. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); see generally Sundby, supra note 42, at 697–703
(discussing approvingly Court’s invocation of the “heroic rugged individual” in promoting autonomy
and dignity values).
290. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965).
291. Adams, 317 U.S. at 280 (emphasis added).
292. See Myron Moskovitz, Advising the Pro Se Defendant: The Trial Court’s Duties under
Faretta, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 329 (2004).
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mistaken in how that value plays out in the interrogation context. The
difficulty, however, has been that the privilege’s values frequently are
expressed either by references to inquisition-like techniques293 or by appeals
to “human dignity” and “free choice.”294 Yet the type of questioning that
Ernesto Miranda was subjected to—a two-hour questioning without
extreme physical or psychological coercion—does not conjure up an image
of the rack and screw, and “free choice” can seem flimsily amorphous when
compared to an underlying crime like rape.295
If we flesh out the underlying constitutional values through the notion of
autonomy and the citizen-government relationship, however, one can see
that in fact much is at stake even in cases like Ernesto Miranda’s. This is in
part because acceptance of a prevalent use of police interrogation power can
lead incrementally to the type of criminal investigative regime that is the
nightmare of democracies. The Court in Escobedo v. Illinois296 voiced such
a concern by quoting at length a powerful observation by Dean Wigmore:
[A]ny system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust
habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must
itself suffer morally thereby. The inclination develops to rely mainly
upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete
investigation of the other sources. The exercise of the power to
extract answers begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of that
power. The simple and peaceful process of questioning breeds a
readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and torture. If
there is a right to an answer, there soon seems to be a right to the
expected answer,[] that is, to a confession of guilt. Thus the legitimate
use grows into the unjust abuse; ultimately, the innocent are
jeopardized by the encroachments of a bad system. Such seems to
have been the course of experience in those legal systems where the
privilege was not recognized.297

293. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153–54 (1944); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 56–57 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring).
294. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457–458 (1966) (twice raising idea that petitioners’
confessions were not “truly . . . the product of free choice”).
295. Id. at 539 (White, J., dissenting) (“Without the reasonably effective performance of the task
of preventing private violence and retaliation, it is idle to talk about human dignity and civilized
values.”).
296. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
297. Id. at 489 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 309 (3d ed. 1940)). The Escobedo Court also
observed:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law
enforcement which comes to depend on the “confession” will, in the long run, be less
reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence
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One need only read the Court’s cases from the whippings in Brown v.
Mississippi forward through the techniques of sleep deprivation, isolation,
relay-questioning by groups of police, and acts of physical and mental
intimidation, to realize that without procedural constraints the desire to
obtain a confession can breed a belief that the end of obtaining the
confession justifies the means. Slippery slope arguments always deserve a
skeptical welcome, but prior experience suggests that Dean Wigmore’s
historical warning should be given close attention when deciding whether
to weaken procedural protections for interrogations.
One could let the argument rest at this point for an invigorated right to
silence founded upon a realistic view of how ordinary individuals behave in
the interrogation room. The historically proven danger that governments
without such restraints slip towards increasingly coercive interrogation
methods, when coupled with recent findings that false confessions occur
even without extreme tactics, together form a powerful rationale for sending
the rugged individual into exile. A further value is at stake, however, that is
bound up in the right to silence and extends to the very fabric of our system
of government. As Chief Justice Warren noted in Miranda, the Court has
viewed the privilege as founded upon a “complex of values,” 298 such as the
“inviolability of human dignity” and the need to maintain a “fair stateindividual balance.”299 One aspect in particular, though, captures a special
danger in upsetting the “state-individual balance” if the privilege is not
properly protected, the right’s role as a safeguard of the individual’s
substantive right of privacy, “a right to a private enclave where he may lead

independently secured through skillful investigation.
Id. at 488–89. Intriguingly, Wigmore was originally skeptical of the privilege’s justification and even
urged abolition, but then later came to view the privilege as essential because of the danger that without
the privilege brutal interrogation practices would become common. See Donald A. Dripps, Against
Police Interrogation—And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
699, 712 & n.56 (1988).
298. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 55–57, 56 n.5
(1964)), abrogated by United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998)). In an oft-quoted passage, the
Murphy Court wrote:
[O]ur unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates “a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire
load;” our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual “to a private enclave where he may lead a private life;” our distrust of selfdeprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege . . . is often “a protection to the
innocent.”
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (citations omitted).
299. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
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a private life.”300 The quote comes from an opinion by Judge Jerome Frank
that more fully (and passionately) argues that the privilege’s protection of
privacy is a linchpin to broader values of democracy and liberty:
The foes of the privilege . . . have mistakenly viewed it solely from a
procedural angle; so considered, it seems to them an unjustifiable
obstacle to the judicial ascertainment of the truth. They ignore the
fact that the privilege—like the constitutional barrier to unreasonable
searches, or the client’s privilege against disclosure of his
confidential disclosures to his lawyer—has, inter alia, an important
“substantive” value, as a safeguard of the individual’s “substantive”
right of privacy, a right to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life. That right is the hallmark of our democracy. The
totalitarian regimes scornfully reject that right. They regard privacy
as an offense against the state. Their goal is utter depersonalization.301
The privilege’s crucial role in “protecting the realm of human thought and
expression” 302 from government intrusion also explains why much is at
stake from a government-citizen balance perspective if the right is diluted.
Few actions by the state against a citizen are more a statement of a
government’s supremacy to a citizen’s standing than the subjection of a
citizen to questioning against her will in an effort to find out her secrets. A
common critique of someone who invokes her right to silence is that only a
guilty person would invoke the privilege, which casts the privilege’s
purpose as solely one of covering up or hiding incriminating information.
In fact, the invocation of the privilege viewed from the perspective of
government-citizen power is a critical means of maintaining the central
premise that the government derives its power from the consent of the
citizenry.303 The right to maintain one’s thoughts to herself—whether they
be guilty, shameful, or simply one’s musings—is a fundamental tenet of

300. Id. at 460 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 579, 581–582 (Frank, J.,
dissenting), rev’d, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)).
301. United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581–582 (Frank, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted), rev’d, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
302. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 119 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); cf. Doe v.
United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 n.9 (1988) (although not finding that the privilege applied, stating, “We
do not disagree with the dissent that “‘[t]he expression of the contents of an individual’s mind’ is
testimonial communication for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”); Doe, 487 U.S. at 211 (it is “the
attempt to force him ‘to disclose the contents of his own mind,’ that implicates the Self-Incrimination
Clause.”) (quoting Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957)). For an interesting use of the idea
of “cognition” as a basis for defining what the privilege protects, see Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace,
The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243
(2004).
303. See generally Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994).
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individual autonomy and dignity; for the government to override that right
is to take away that autonomy and dignity.
This is why while we may recoil most strongly when brutality is used to
obtain a confession, an important constitutional value is still actively
undermined whenever a citizen is unable to assert the right to keep her
thoughts free from government prying. The long-term harm results not from
the brutality, but in the police placing the citizen in a position where she
loses the ability to exercise a right fundamental to preserving the citizen’s
autonomy vis-à-vis the state, whether the loss of ability is due to the inherent
pressures of the interrogation room or the swinging of a truncheon. This
danger is especially true given Justice Black’s observation in Chambers that
coercive interrogation techniques have often been targeted at the
“numerically weak, the friendless, and the powerless,” 304 making the
oppression fall on those citizens least able to assert their rights.
It is the subversion of this basic value that causes many to intuitively
mourn the decline of Miranda despite its shortcomings. The defenders of
Miranda understand that the decision was not simply a criminal procedure
right concerning a suspect and the police, but was a monumental effort to
acknowledge and to help enshrine the individual’s right to selfdetermination and autonomy against the government. 305 Consequently,
when the Court places the rugged individual in the interrogation room rather
than the everyday citizen, it not only is an act of fiction that defies empirical
and practical experience, it is a recasting of the government-citizen
relationship. 306 From this perspective, a police officer reading Miranda
304. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238. See also Trocino, supra note 261, at 88 (“[T]he
interrogations that lead to confessions are usually administered by the powerful against the powerless.”).
305. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460:
[T]he privilege against self-incrimination—the essential mainstay of our adversary system—is
founded on a complex of values. All these policies point to one overriding thought: the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government—state or
federal—must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a “fair stateindividual balance,” to require the government “to shoulder the entire load,” to respect the
inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that
the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own
independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own
mouth.
(citations omitted).
306. The fundamental values at stake have also been expressed through the idea that the United
States is an accusatorial rather than an inquisitional system. As Justice Frankfurter observed:
[Obtaining an involuntary confession] violates the underlying principle in our enforcement of
the criminal law. Ours is the accusatorial, as opposed to the inquisitorial, system. Such has been
the characteristic of Anglo-American criminal justice since it freed itself from practices
borrowed by the Star Chamber from the Continent whereby an accused was interrogated in
secret for hours on end. Under our system, society carries the burden of proving its charge
against the accused not out of his own mouth. It must establish its case, not by interrogation of
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warnings to a suspect is not an isolated event taking place in an interrogation
room. Rather, the interaction in the interrogation room is part of a far larger
enterprise that strives to maintain a balance of government-citizen power
that preserves the government by consent that the Founders intended.307
CONCLUSION
The extent to which we should tailor a constitutional right to the realities
of human behavior is a question that arises with many constitutional rights.
Can prosecutors set aside their prosecutorial perspective and objectively
evaluate evidence in deciding if evidence is exculpatory and therefore needs
to be disclosed to the accused?308 Are litigators able to abide by Batson v.
Kentucky 309 and put out of their mind stereotypes when exercising
peremptory challenges to choose a jury? 310 Will the ordinary citizen
confronted by a police officer’s request to consent to a stop or search in
the accused, even under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured through
skillful investigation. ”The law will not suffer a prisoner to be made the deluded instrument of
his own conviction.”. . . Protracted, systematic and uncontrolled subjection of an accused to
interrogation by the police for the purpose of eliciting disclosures or confessions is subversive
of the accusatorial system. It is the inquisitorial system without its safeguards.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54–55 (1949) (citations omitted).
307. In this sense, every motion to suppress a confession as a Miranda or Due Process violation
serves an important civic function by bringing into a public forum a reminder of the limits of police and
government power as it relates to the citizen. See Scott E. Sundby, Mapp v. Ohio’s Unsung Hero: The
Suppression Hearing as Morality Play, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 255 (2010). See also REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 11 (1963):
The survival of our system of criminal justice and the values which it advances depends upon
a constant, searching, and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority
at all stages of the process. . . . The loss to the interests of accused individuals, occasioned by
these failures, are great and apparent. . . . Beyond these considerations, however, is the fact that
[this situation is] detrimental to the proper functioning of the system of justice and that the loss
in vitality of the adversary system, thereby occasioned, significantly endangers the basic
interests of a free community.
308. See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590 (2006) (“Perhaps prosecutors sometimes fail to make
decisions that rationally further justice, not because they fail to value justice, but because they are, in
fact, irrational. They are irrational because they are human, and all human decision makers share a
common set of information-processing tendencies that depart from perfect rationality.”);
Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of
Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643 (2002) (questioning whether prosecutors invested
in the decision to prosecute can assess evidence fairly).
309. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding under the Equal Protection Clause that a lawyer cannot exercise
a peremptory strike based on race).
310. See Robert P. Mosteller, Responding to McCleskey and Batson: The North Carolina Racial
Justice Act Confronts Racial Peremptory Challenges in Death Cases, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM L. 103, 107
(2012) (arguing Batson was based on an “unrealistically optimistic view”). The widespread criticism of
Batson’s failure to eliminate race-based peremptory challenges has led the state of Washington to adopt
a rule that bars specific justifications that historically have been associated with racial bias and that
allows a judge to deny a strike if an “objective observer” could see race as a factor in dismissing the
juror. See WASH. CTS. GEN. R. 37.
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reality feel that she can tell a police officer that she is invoking her Fourth
Amendment right and refuse?311
In this sense, this Article’s argument that the Court is making
assumptions about human behavior in crafting its regulation of police
interrogation is unremarkable. What is remarkable, however, is that unlike
in almost any other constitutional context where the Court almost invariably
casts the citizen as a rugged individual who can live up to a romanticized
vision of civic courage, 312 the Court has at times acknowledged that
interrogation practices can in fact overbear even the hardiest soul.313 Indeed,
in this regard Miranda v. Arizona may be the Court’s most honest opinion,
not just in its recognition of human frailty, but by incorporating that
understanding into its doctrine.
We now know through DNA testing and empirical studies that the
Miranda Court’s assumptions were in fact correct. The inherent pressures
of the interrogation context when combined with standard interrogation
techniques not only are likely to compel individuals to talk, they can lead to
false confessions. If anything, Miranda was overly optimistic in its belief of
how an individual could be bolstered to withstand the pressures.
Since Miranda, however, the Court has largely retreated from this rare
epiphany of realism and increasingly turned back to the rugged individual
ideal. This retreat may be because of a reassessment of the tradeoff between
convictions and allowing suspects to exercise their right to remain silent; it
may also be a refusal to believe that individuals are not made of sufficiently
stern fortitude to resist police pressures so that confessions are acts of
repentance or a miscalculated battle of wits; or perhaps it is from a desire to
have constitutional standards reflect the Justices’ ideals of who a citizen
should be, even if most of us could not live up to the standard. Or, of course,
it may be some mix of these reasons.
Whatever the motivations, however, the Court should explain, especially
in the face of the growing number of false confessions, why it is rejecting
an approach that realistically reflects human nature. This is not simply a call
to reinvigorate Miranda, although if the Court is serious about giving
individuals autonomy and dignity in the exercise of the privilege, that is a
311. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). See generally Janice Nadler, No Need to
Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 156 (2002) (“[T]he Court’s
Fourth Amendment consent jurisprudence is either based on serious errors about human behavior and
judgment, or else has devolved into a fiction of the crudest sort—a mere device for attaining the desired
legal consequence.”).
312. Although a number of Justices have at various points decried that the Court’s jurisprudence
often does not accord with the realities of human nature, Justice Marshall was perhaps the Justice who
was most focused on how a holding would fare in the ‘real world.’ See generally Green & Richman,
supra note 68.
313. See supra Part III.
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necessary first step. A number of proposals have been put forward to make
Miranda more effective given the lessons of experience.314
Miranda warnings alone, however, cannot protect the susceptible
individual, especially the innocent citizen, in the interrogation room.315 This
Article’s greatest hope is that the Court will listen to the many reforms that
are being proposed, ranging from mandatory taping to pre-trial reliability
hearings316 and adopt a view of voluntariness that incorporates the realities
of human nature when placed in an interrogation context. But if it does not,
then this is a call to the Court to explain why it is refusing to do so and how
that refusal can be squared with the constitutional norms underlying the
privilege against self-incrimination and the Due Process Clause. Without
such an explanation, the Court’s rugged individual approach to police
interrogation is no more than legal mythology masquerading as legal
doctrine.

314. See Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2016) (suggesting reforms to
Miranda warnings, including how they are administered, to make them more effective).
315. Richard A. Leo et al., Promoting Accuracy in the Use of Confession Evidence: An Argument
for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 787–90
(2013) (criticizing the “the Miranda diversion” as failing to have any meaningful impact and pointing
out that all of the wrongful confessors had waived their rights). Of course, even if Miranda may not be
the most effective means for addressing the false confession problem, it still serves other critical
purposes in terms of regulating the government-citizen relationship. See supra notes 293–307 and
accompanying text.
316. The American Law Institute (ALI) has recently promulgated principles regarding
interrogations that provide an excellent starting point. With confessions becoming one of the most
studied areas of the law, crafting procedures to guard against wrongful confessions is producing a
number of promising proposals ranging from the mandatory taping of confessions, Christopher
Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded Questioning: After Fifty Years of Miranda
Jurisprudence, Still Two (or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1157 (2017), to pretrial
reliability assessments before a confession can be admitted, see Leo et al., supra note 315, at 792–809
(calling for pretrial reliability assessments).

